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1. INTRODUCTION 
Accounting is a necessary requirement for any business, organization or entity, including 
public and private pension schemes. It is essential for a business or organization to keep 
track of its resources (Britton, 2014). A public pension system should not be an exception, 
irrespective of the method used for financing the benefits. Financial reporting is one of the 
foundations of good management. High-quality financial reports are essential to ensure that 
decisions are based on the most up-to-date and accurate understanding of an organization’s 
financial position (OECD/IFAC, 2017).  
Most government-managed pension schemes around the world are based on the pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) financing method, whereby current contributions finance current benefits. 
Financial reporting of PAYG pension schemes based exclusively on cash accounting is not 
a suitable framework for accounting the assets and liabilities allocated to pay for the 
scheduled benefits 1 . Reporting should be based mainly on the accrual accounting 
principle2. Indeed, in many countries the financial reporting of public pensions has at best 
been very poor, with public budgets only giving information about the expected annual 
income from contributions and disbursement on pensions, and accounting standards being 
used only “haphazardly”3. There are, however, some countries that serve as examples of 
good financial reporting as regards public pensions. These include Canada (OSFIC, 2012, 
2013 and 2014), the US (BOT, 2017), Japan (AAD, 2017), the UK (GAD, 2017) and 
Sweden (TSPS, 2017).  
There has been long-standing interest in improving the measurement and recognition of 
unfunded public pension entitlements (Metzger, 2018). In fact it became compulsory in 
2017 for European Union (EU) Member States to disclose unfunded pension liabilities4 for 
social security pension schemes in a supplementary table to the national accounts5. The 
overall aim of this supplementary table is to present the opening and closing stocks of 
pension entitlements for all social insurance pension schemes along with transactions and 
other economic flows during the period that account for the difference between the 
opening and closing positions, thus systematically showing pension obligations for all these 
schemes and facilitating international comparability (Keuning, 2010; EUROSTAT, 2011). 
However, the record of accrued-to-date liabilities6 is not an appropriate indicator of the 
system’s sustainability. They capture only one side of a pension scheme’s balance sheet. 
From a Social Security Administration's point of view, a valuable instrument for reporting 
the system’s financial status is the so-called actuarial balance (AB), given that it explicitly 
1 Cash accounting recognizes transactions when cash is paid or received, but these need not be related to the 
timing of the services provided or benefits received. 
2 Accrual (or comprehensive) accounting recognizes transactions or events when they occur, irrespective of 
when the cash is paid or received. It seeks to match the costs incurred during a particular accounting period 
with the benefits earned, and the revenues with the goods or services provided. 
3 According to Hoogervorst (2012), “Around the world, governments give very incomplete information 
about the huge, unfunded social security liabilities they have incurred. Many executives in the private sector 
would end up in jail if they reported like Ministers of Finance, and rightly so.” 
4 The term “unfunded pension liability” should be understood as referring to pension obligations financed by 
the PAYG method. As will be seen later, funding and sustainability are not necessarily linked. A PAYG 
scheme can be sustainable and a partially funded plan can be unsustainable. If the method for financing 
pension benefits is prefunding, then “unfunded pension liability” is the amount at any given time by which 
future payment obligations exceed the present value of funds available to pay them (Kelley, 2014).  
5 This obligation comes from the updating of the international System of National Accounts (SNA, 2009), 
which has been adopted into the European System of National Accounts -ESA 2010- (EUROSTAT, 2013). 
6 This measure can be interpreted as the amount of resources that has to be set aside today in order to finance 
all the pension rights that have been earned up to a given year (Holzmann et al., 2001; Kaier and Müller, 
2015). 
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records assets and liabilities. It can be said that the AB supplies a positive incentive to 
improve the financial management and sustainability of PAYG systems by minimizing the 
traditional mismatch between the planning horizons of electors and politicians and those of 
the system itself. Moreover, the regular disclosure of pension data works against the 
“squared fiscal illusion”7, because the burden on future generations is made transparent 
and the backdoor shifting of this burden is made more difficult (Wendorff, 2010). It is 
worth mentioning that the AB approach is not based on traditional budgetary principles 
that consider public finances as a whole. Instead it deals with the financing of public 
pensions by taking into account only the specific sources of finance for the scheme.  
As far as compiling an AB for PAYG systems is concerned, there are basically two options: 
what are known as the Swedish (TSPS, 2017) and the US models (BOT, 2017) 8. The 
Swedish actuarial balance sheet (ABS) can be described as a financial statement listing the 
pension system's obligations to contributors and pensioners at a particular date, with the 
amounts of the various assets (financial and mainly through contributions) that underwrite 
those commitments. It aims to provide a solvency indicator by measuring the value of the 
commitments to contributors and pensioners taken on by the system, rather than by 
considering its market value. 
The US AB is a measure of the programme’s financial status for its 75-year valuation 
period as a whole. Essentially, it shows the difference between the income and the cost of 
the programme expressed as a percentage of taxable payrolls over the valuation period 
(Plamondon et al., 2002). This single number summarizes the adequacy of programme 
financing for the period. Other standard measures are also reported on the US AB, such as 
annual balance ratios, the cross-over date (when non-interest receipts begin falling short of 
programme outlays), the date of trust-fund exhaustion, and other summarized actuarial 
balances calculated over truncated horizons of 25 and 50 years or even under perpetuity 
and stochastic calculations. In contrast to the US AB model, in the Swedish ABS the assets 
and liabilities of the pension system are valued mainly on the basis of events and 
transactions that are verifiable at the time of valuation with no need for explicit projections. 
The present paper deals with the development of a social insurance accounting model for a 
notional defined contribution (NDC) scheme combining retirement and long-term care 
(LTC) contingencies. It presents and discusses the main entries on a Swedish-type ABS 
specifically designed for NDC schemes. The Swedish ABS relies on standard double-entry 
bookkeeping and gives priority to the measurement of assets and liabilities as they stand at 
one particular point of time, which means that it is suitable for reporting the system’s 
solvency status. Such a framework can also show periodic changes in the system’s financial 
position by means of an income statement (also known as the gain and loss account).  
The ABS is compiled using a methodology equivalent to an open group approach, although 
at first sight it might look like the closed group approach widely applied in fully-funded 
systems. The open group approach is based on the assumption that a plan is ongoing so 
that future new entrants can be included in the valuations9.  
7 Usually a situation in which the public perceive that debt financing seems to be “costless”, although in 
reality the burden is merely shifted to future generations. 
8 The actuarial valuation report on the Canadian Pension Plan (OSFIC, 2012, 2013 and 2014) and the 
Japanese actuarial balance (AAD, 2017) also present relevant differential features despite the fact that they 
follow the US model. 
9 This assumption is similar to the ‘going concern’ concept in accounting, which implies that the business will 
continue its operations in the future and will not liquidate or be forced to discontinue operations for any 
reason. 
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This paper builds on previous work carried out in the fields of actuarial balances10 and 
NDC schemes, its starting point being the papers by Pérez-Salamero et al. (2017), TSPS 
(2017) and Vidal-Meliá et al. (2018). Pérez-Salamero et al. (2017) develop a Swedish-type 
ABS for an NDC scheme with disability and minimum pension benefits. TSPS (2017) is 
the most recent annual report of the Swedish pension system, and presents its financial 
status and income statement along with a description of the accounting principles used for 
valuing the system’s assets and liabilities. Finally, the paper by Vidal-Meliá et al. (2018) 
explores the idea of using an NDC scheme embedded in the public pension system to 
provide retirement and graded cash-for-care (CFC) benefits in order to help pensioners 
cope with the cost of LTC.  
As far as we know, this paper contributes to filling a gap in the literature because it deals 
with a subject that has not been explored in detail in the case of a combined pension 
system covering retirement and LTC. Our proposal has practical implications, which could 
be interesting not only for countries with an already-functioning NDC system but also for 
social security actuaries, public finance economists, pension policy experts and policy-
makers. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 develops a social 
insurance accounting model for an NDC scheme combining retirement and LTC 
contingencies. Once the model's background has been explained, for clarity’s sake we 
divide this section into three subsections. The first describes the model’s main accounting 
principles and the assumptions used for valuation, the second develops a Swedish-type 
ABS for an NDC scheme combining retirement and LTC contingencies, and finally the 
third presents the income statement. Section 3 provides a numerical illustration, compiling 
an ABS based on the proposed NDC scheme. This section is split into two different parts. 
The first shows the ABS under the mature state assumption, while the second illustrates 
annual changes in the system’s financial position by means of an income statement for an 
already-functioning system. The paper ends with the concluding comments, a technical 
appendix and a list of abbreviations. 
2.-THE MODEL 
This section presents and discusses a social insurance accounting model for an NDC 
scheme combining retirement and LTC contingencies. The link between old-age income 
and long-term care policy has long been acknowledged in the literature (Christopherson, 
1992; Scanlon, 1992; Nuttall et al., 1994; Chen, 2001; Pitacco, 2002), and it is well 
established that retirement and LTC planning are considered to go hand-in-hand (Getzen, 
1998; Murtaugh et al., 2001; Spillman et al., 2003; Yakobosky, 2002; Turner et al., 2017; 
Kenny et al., 2017). 
The underlying framework supporting this accounting model relies on the proposal made 
by Vidal-Meliá et al. (2018), who explore an NDC approach aimed at using CFC benefits to 
help pensioners to cope with the cost of LTC if they become dependent. The purpose of 
their proposal is to provide partial coverage of the LTC costs incurred by retirement 
pensioners. The provision of LTC in this case would be considered one of the pillars of 
10 The following can all be cited as being relevant: Settergren (2003), Takayama (2004), Settergren and Mikula 
(2005, 2007), Boado-Penas et al. (2008), Rashbrooke (2008), Boado-Penas et al. (2011), Settergren (2013), 
Boado-Penas and Vidal-Meliá (2013), Vidal-Meliá and Boado-Penas (2013), Billig and Ménard (2013), 
Ventura-Marco and Vidal-Meliá (2014), Vidal-Meliá (2014) and Metzger (2016, 2018). All of these have dealt 
with the Swedish-type ABS, which has been compiled for various countries including Sweden, Spain, Japan, 
Canada, New Zealand, Germany and Switzerland.  
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multi-pillar public schemes. The model can be used for life care annuities (LCAs) or 
enhanced pension annuities (EPAs). 
The way LTC is treated in their proposal has several advantages. Briefly, it makes it easier 
to integrate both contingencies into an NDC framework, it raises awareness of LTC needs 
and, at least on paper, it is financially sound and sustainable over time. Furthermore, it does 
not raise the contribution rate for workers (EPA option), it extends LTC coverage, it 
introduces redistribution in a very transparent way and it allows the sponsor (the state) to 
more effectively take into account trends in disability, longevity and other sources of risk 
when “pricing” benefits. 
The main elements underpinning their proposal are the NDC, LTC, CFC and LCA (EPA). 
For the sake of completeness (and clarity), it is worth giving a brief definition of each.  
An NDC pension scheme 11  is a PAYG pension plan that mimics a funded defined 
contribution plan. An NDC scheme works in much the same way as ordinary savings in the 
bank12. Contributors continue to pay for today’s pensioners but their contributions are also 
credited to notional accounts13 that get a (notional) rate of return tied to wage growth or 
overall economic growth, rather than providing a return on specific financial assets. When 
they retire the amount of their individual pension benefit is based on the notional capital 
they have each accumulated, which is converted into an annuity in line with a formula 
based on life expectancy at their retirement age. The fundamental logic of NDC schemes is 
that every monetary unit of a liability has to have a financial counterpart, i.e. contributions 
on earnings for NDC rights and contributions from the government to cover non-
contributory rights (NCRs). This is a principle that when fulfilled, ceteris paribus, assures 
long-term financial sustainability. The proposal made by Vidal-Meliá et al. (2018) is a logical 
extension of NDC principles to include LTC coverage. This system mimics the LTC 
coverage provided by a LCA or EPA in an NDC framework. 
Long-term care (LTC) includes the health and social support services provided to those 
with chronic illness or physical or mental disability to help them achieve and maintain an 
optimal level of functioning. The need for LTC typically arises as part of the normal ageing 
process, but can also be due to an injury or illness such as a stroke, or due to a cognitive 
impairment like dementia or Alzheimer’s disease. The degree of LTC need is often assessed 
according to a scale measuring basic activities of daily living (ADL) 14  and/or the 
instrumental activities of daily living (IADL)15. Whether or not an individual will need LTC 
and if so for how long is uncertain. Consequently, it is important to understand the LTC 
risks. It is equally important to individuals (and families) who are planning for retirement 
and are uncertain about their need for LTC. As a contributory contingency, it has been 
11 For a general view of NDCs, see for example Valdés-Prieto (2000), Barr (2006) or Holzmann (2017). 
12 This could be seen as negative and might make it difficult to introduce NDC pension reform in some 
countries. In Germany it was politically unfeasible to introduce a Swedish-style reform because an NDC 
system seemed too much like a fully-funded system, which is viewed with suspicion by Germans (Börsch-
Supan, 2016). This reasoning is also valid as regards the latest (disappointing) Spanish pension reform (Vidal-
Meliá, 2014).  
13 The explicit record is very important for many reasons, given that unless there is pension debt shown on 
the government’s balance sheet as a liability, pension wealth cannot exist on the individual’s balance sheet as 
an asset (Holzmann et al., 2001). 
14 ADLs are basic self-care tasks, akin to the skills that people usually learn in early childhood. Elderly people 
who maintain their ADLs have a higher level of independence. There are six basic ADLs: eating, bathing, 
dressing, toileting, transferring (walking) and continence. 
15 IADLs are the complex skills needed to successfully live independently. They include cooking, cleaning, 
doing laundry, shopping, using the telephone, accessing means of transport, taking medicines and managing 
money. 
5 
 
                                                 
provided in the German contributory pension system since the mid-1990s. Other OECD 
countries with public contributory LTC arrangements include Japan, Korea, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg16. 
In order to deal with an increase in pensioner care needs the proposal uses a cash-for-care 
benefit (CFC), of which there are many with various names and forms (Da Roit et al., 2016; 
Damiani et al., 2011). These cash programmes aim to give households some choice in care 
decisions, thereby fostering and supporting family care, developing care markets and 
containing costs. 
Finally, but importantly, a life care annuity (LCA) is a lifetime annuity in which the LTC 
benefit is defined in terms of an uplift with respect to the basic amount. In return for the 
payment of a contribution collected over time, the LCA provides a stream of fixed-income 
payments for the lifetime of the annuitant (pensioner). It also provides an extra stream of 
payments if the annuitant requires LTC. An LCA with degree-related benefits means that 
the amount paid depends on the annuitant’s degree of disability. An enhanced pension 
annuity (EPA) is an LCA in which the uplifts are financed by a reduction – with respect to 
the basic pension – in the benefit paid while the pensioner is healthy (Haberman and 
Pitacco, 1999; Rickayzen, 2007; Warshawsky, 2012; Brown and Warshawsky, 2013; Pitacco, 
2014; Pla-Porcel et al., 2016).  
Because the model’s technicalities and assumptions are too numerous to detail in full here, 
we limit ourselves to summarizing those that are most relevant to this analysis.  
Affiliates contribute to both retirement and LTC contingencies. The LTC need is linked to 
retirement ages. There is a defined contribution rate (fixed over time), 𝜃𝑎 , to cover both 
contingencies. There are 𝑛 levels of dependence, with level 1 being the least severe and 
level 𝑛 the most. Becoming an LTC recipient means that the amount of retirement pension 
is automatically increased by a certain percentage, 𝜉, to help pay for care services, i.e. those 
dependent on care obtain additional cash to hire the required services as they see fit.  
The model can use life care annuities (LCAs) or enhanced pension annuities (EPAs).  
With LCAs, the LTC benefit (in the form of CFC) is defined in terms of an uplift with 
respect to the basic pension, 𝑏, which is paid out from retirement onwards and replaced by 
the LTC annuity benefit, 𝑏 ∙ (1 + 𝜉𝑟𝑗), 𝑗 ∈ {1,2,⋯ ,𝑛}, in the case of a particular level of 
LTC claim. An active pensioner is denoted by 𝑟. The uplifts can be financed over the 
whole accumulation period by contributions higher than those needed for entitlement to 
retirement benefit 𝑏.  
The EPA is an LCA in which the uplifts are financed by a reduction – with respect to basic 
retirement benefit 𝑏 – in the benefit paid while the pensioner is healthy. Thus the reduced 
benefit, 𝑏ℎ, is paid out as long as the retiree is healthy, and the uplifted benefit, 𝑏ℎ ∙ (1 +
𝜉𝑟𝑗), will be paid in the case of an LTC claim. Logically 𝑏ℎ < 𝑏 < 𝑏 ∙ (1 + 𝜉𝑟𝑗). 
The system provides a minimum pension depending on individual health status, with the 
amount being related to the average wage. The age giving entitlement to retirement 
pension, 𝑥𝑒 + 𝐴 , is fixed. We also assume that participants’ lives last 𝜔 − 𝑥𝑒  periods, 
where 𝜔 is the maximum lifespan and 𝑥𝑒 is the earliest age of entry into the system. 
16  Readers interested in LTC issues can consult the papers by Colombo and Mercier, (2012), De la 
Maisonneuve and Oliveira Martins (2013), Swartz (2013), Worrall and Chaussalet (2015) and Costa-Font et al. 
(2017) to name just a few. 
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Although an NDC scheme provides benefit for everyone who works and contributes to it, 
it will not necessarily provide everyone with a benefit that gives sufficient income for them 
to live on. It has long been recognized that NDC schemes should be supplemented with a 
minimum pension benefit (MPB) (Holzmann and Palmer, 2006; Barr and Diamond, 2009; 
Chłoń-Domińczak and Strzelecki, 2013; Hagemejer and Woodall, 2014). The introduction 
of an MPB is a way of preserving the social sustainability of the scheme as well as the 
adequacy of the pension. 
As regards the supplementary amount for dependence, it is assumed that the ages for 
eligibility to receive benefits are to be found in age interval [𝑥𝑒 + 𝐴 + 1,𝜔]. 
The contribution base changes (in positive or negative terms) at an annual rate of 𝑔 and the 
economically active population increases or decreases over time at an annual rate of 𝛾, 
affecting all groups of contributors equally. Thus the system's income from contributions 
(covered wage bill) also grows (decreases) at rate 𝐺 = (1 + 𝑔) · (1 + 𝛾) − 1. 
The model includes the so-called “survivor dividend”, which means the account balances 
of participants who do not survive to retirement are distributed as inheritance capital 
(gains) to the accounts of the surviving participants on a birth cohort basis (Boado-Penas 
and Vidal-Meliá, 2014; Arnold-Gaille et al., 2016; Vidal-Meliá et al., 2016; Knell, 2018).  
The initial amount of the annuity depends on several elements, the most important being 
the pension balance accumulated at retirement age. However, there are others that also 
matter: the current mortality of the cohort in the year the contributor reaches retirement, 
the LTC incidence rates by age, the probabilities of moving to a worse state of dependence, 
the amount of the uplifted benefits, the current mortality of dependent persons, and a 
notional imputed future indexation rate, 𝛼 (see Technical Appendix). 
Now that the model's background has been given, for the sake of clarity this section is 
divided into three subsections. The first describes the model’s main accounting valuation 
principles and assumptions. The second develops the Swedish-type ABS for an NDC 
scheme combining both retirement and LTC contingencies. The third presents the income 
statement.  
2.1.-Accounting principles for the valuation of assets and liabilities and main 
assumptions. 
The Swedish ABS is an assessment of the plan's financial position at a specific point in 
time, and economic, financial and actuarial assumptions are primarily based on past 
experience and standard tables (mortality, disability). It could be said that the Swedish ABS 
approach artificially freezes the NDC scheme for a split second in the same way that a still 
from a film freezes the action. This snapshot is taken to determine the plan’s liabilities and 
its solvency status. To a certain extent, this accounting procedure is in line with the 
“insurance approach” (IPSASB, 2015). The information provided will only be relevant and 
faithfully representative when there is a clear link between the benefits paid by a social 
security scheme and the revenue that finances them. An NDC scheme meets this 
requirement.  
Swedish accounting practice in NDC schemes (TSPS, 2017) means that the assets and 
liabilities of the pension system are valued mainly on the basis of events and transactions 
that are verifiable at the time of valuation, with no need for explicit projections. The 
sponsor is not required to report a higher life expectancy today just because life expectancy 
is likely to be higher in the future. This is not due to any belief that life expectancy or other 
factors such as transition rates or the expected time spent as dependent will remain totally 
constant. Instead, the accounting is designed not to include changed conditions until those 
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changes are reflected in the events and transactions on which the accounting is based. 
According to this principle, the main data should be updated on an annual basis. 
The ABS is compiled using a methodology equivalent to the open group approach. This is 
based on the assumption that a plan is ongoing so that future new entrants can be included 
in the valuations. This approach explicitly accounts for sources of financing by considering 
the benefits and contributions of both current and future plan participants, or to put it 
another way, it includes future generations of contributors and beneficiaries who 
participate in the plan’s cost and risk-sharing. In a closed group approach only current 
participants are included, with no new entrants allowed. 
The accounts liabilities under this method consist of the present value not only of benefits 
in payment and benefits expected to become payable to current participants, but also of 
benefits expected to become payable to new entrants. Correspondingly, the assets include 
the present value of expected future contributions made by or on account of current 
participants and new entrants. As mentioned earlier, this model can be considered as open 
group in any particular year 𝑡 because it takes new entrants into account and assumes that 
there will be contributions to meet the liabilities, but the valuation formulas consider only 
pensioners and contributors at the valuation date. This particular conception of open group 
is used from a dynamic perspective, since the model enables us to draw up the ABS at any 
date 𝑡 after the system reaches a mature state (Ventura-Marco and Vidal-Meliá, 2014). As 
we will see later, estimating the value of the contribution flow (contribution asset) by 
multiplying it by the turnover duration (𝑇𝐷 ) is equivalent to discounting an assumed 
perpetual constant flow of contributions by the inverse of the 𝑇𝐷. This involves an open 
group approach with a perpetual time horizon.  
Increasing the length of the projection period can be said to enhance the assessment of 
financial sustainability, although it also increases the uncertainty of the results. Our social 
insurance accounting method presents the system’s financial position by comparing the 
accrued pension liability with the value of the contribution flow at a particular point in 
time, which is estimated without projections. Since projections are based on a large set of 
demographic, economic and behavioural assumptions, the exact value of pension liabilities 
and the income from contributions is highly uncertain, and this is how the uncertainty 
surrounding long-term economic, demographic and financial projections is avoided when 
using the Swedish method.  
As regards the discount rate assumption, this is the most influential actuarial input affecting 
both funding ratios and contribution requirements (Chen and Matkin, 2017). In line with 
the classic Swedish ABS (TSPS, 2017), which basically aims to compute the value of the 
commitments to contributors and pensioners taken on by the system, rather than calculate 
how much the system would have to pay a third party if it was decided to contract out or 
transfer those commitments, the interest rate for discounting liabilities to pensioners is 
taken to be the growth rate of the covered wage bill (𝐺). The papers by Settergren and 
Mikula (2005), Boado-Penas et al. (2008), Gronchi and Nisticò (2008), Ventura-Marco and 
Vidal-Melia (2014), Vidal-Meliá (2014), Pérez-Salamero et al. (2017) and Metzger (2018), to 
name just a few, have used a discount rate tied to wage growth or overall economic growth.  
Our proposal includes a minimum pension benefit (MPB), so depending on the solution 
adopted to cover its cost, the discount rate used for valuing the liabilities to pensioners 
caused by NCRs could be different from the growth rate of the covered wage bill. If the 
alternative were to record supplementary pension payments in the same accounting period 
or fiscal year in which the MPBs were granted, then the asset counterpart would be a buffer 
fund financed by general government revenues. Using a buffer fund has the advantage of 
forcing politicians to guarantee pension promises made in the shape of MPBs, and it also 
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keeps the system in order. In this case the interest rate for discounting the liabilities to 
pensioners could be the variation rate in the general tax base (𝑇). Public funds in the UK 
use a discount rate based on the expected long-term growth of GDP (Biggs, 2012; 
Andonov et al., 2017). If instead the alternative chosen were to record a claim on the state 
budget and have the state make partial payments on this debt, the discount rate could be a 
riskless rate (government bonds). Brown and Pennacchi (2016) argue that public pension 
funds should use lower discount rates than private pension funds because public plan 
benefits are virtually free of risk, since accrued benefits are usually backed by constitutional 
guarantees. 
In order to simplify the analysis, the interest rate for discounting liabilities to pensioners 
(deriviring from NDCs or NCRs) in this paper is considered to be the growth rate of the 
covered wage bill (𝐺).  
2.2.-The Swedish-type ABS for an NDC scheme combining retirement and LTC 
contingencies. 
In this subsection we develop the main entries for a Swedish-type ABS designed 
specifically for NDC schemes. The idea of presenting the financial status of an NDC 
pension system in terms of assets and liabilities was first introduced in the Swedish NDC 
system in 2001. Our proposal, as shown in Table 1, is a little more complex17 due to the 
fact that two contingencies need to be disclosed and the commitments deriving from the 
NCRs also have to be explicitly accounted for. 
In this proposal the ABS splits the system into two parts: the NDC part and the 
redistributive part, which includes the assets and liabilities originating from NCRs. 
The right-hand side of Table 1 shows the liability to pensioners for LTC (Pen_(LTC)) and 
the liability to pensioners for retirement (Pen_(R)). In general terms, the liability to 
pensioners can be defined as the present value of the amount of all the benefits in payment 
stemming from contributory rights plus non-contributory rights at the valuation date of the 
balance sheet. In this scheme there are two types of pensioners: for retirement and for 
LTC.  
This side also includes the liability to contributors for LTC (Con_(LTC)) and the liability 
to contributors for retirement (Con_(R)). When referring to contributors, actuaries use the 
term "technical provisions for rights being acquired", which will be reported here as 
liabilities to contributors. In this particular NDC scheme, the liability to current 
contributors is considered to be the notional capital accumulated in the participants' 
accounts (formed by the contributions made by participants, plus the return deriving from 
the notional rate of interest credited to those accounts, plus the survivor dividend). But 
what about the liabilities to contributors for NCRs (Con_(R) NCR and Con_(R) NCR)? 
To quantify these liabilities there are two alternatives.  
Table 1: The ABS for an NDC scheme combining retirement and LTC contingencies. 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Contribution asset for retirement: CA_(R) 
Liability to contributors for retirement: 
Con_(R) 
Liability to pensioners for retirement: 
Pen_(R)  
Public contribution asset: PCA_(R) or buffer Liability to contributors for retirement: 
17 Disability benefits, survivor benefits and guaranteed minimum pensions are excluded from the Swedish 
accounting because they are not part of the NDC system but are financed separately, basically using general 
tax revenue. 
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fund for retirement: BF_(R) Con_(R) NCR 
Liability to pensioners for retirement: 
Pen_(R) NCR 
Contribution asset for long-term care: CA_(LTC) 
Liability to contributors for LTC: 
Con_(LTC) 
Liability to pensioners for LTC: 
Pen_(LTC)  
Public contribution asset: PCA_(LTC) or buffer 
fund for long-term care: BF_(LTC) 
Liability to contributors for LTC: 
Con_(LTC) NCR 
Liability to pensioners for LTC: 
Pen_(LTC) NCR 
Accumulated deficit: Ad_(R+LTC) Accumulated surplus: As_(R+LTC) 
Losses for the period: L_(R+LTC) Gains for the period: G_(R+LTC) 
Total Assets: (𝑨𝒕𝑺) Total Liabilities: (𝑽𝒕𝑺) 
The first is in line with one of the main principles used for compiling this type of ABS: the 
pension system’s liabilities are valued mainly on the basis of events and transactions that 
are verifiable at the time of valuation with no need for explicit projections. In accordance 
with this principle, the liability to contributors for retirement and LTC due to NCRs should 
be zero. This view of recognizing and measuring social benefits coincides with the latest 
point at which an obligating event may give rise to amounts being recognized in the 
financial statements (IPSASB, 2015). Under this option, public sector entities should only 
recognize legal obligations in respect of social benefits. Until a legal obligation exists and 
the due date has arrived, a claim is unenforceable. A government can always avoid settling 
such an obligation, for example by modifying the eligibility criteria or amending legislation 
prior to this point.  
The second involves going against the principle of not making explicit projections. The 
inclusion of an MPB implies valuing the accrued minimum benefit by means of the 
prospective and forecasting method (see details in the Technical Appendix). 
Finally, this side also contains the accumulated surplus (As_(R+LTC)), the gains for the 
period (G_(R+LTC)) and the total liabilities (𝑉𝑡𝑆). The accumulated surplus is the pension 
system’s “accumulated gain” or net worth, which is owned by the system's sponsor, in this 
case the state. As we will see later in Section 2.3., the annual gain is the difference between 
the change in the value of the assets and the actuarial liabilities. 
On the assets side we find the contribution asset for LTC (CA_(LTC)) and the 
contribution asset for retirement (CA_(R)). In PAYG systems the contribution flow is 
considered the principal asset, and the double-entry bookkeeping of the Swedish ABS is 
based on this reasoning. The Swedish concept of the value of the contribution flow is 
expressed as the contribution asset, which can be understood as the maximum liabilities 
that would have existed on the last day of the accounting period if there were no changes 
in the age-related income distribution, age-related mortality and morbidity, the size of the 
contribution (tax) base, the structure of uplifts to help pensioners cope with LTC and the 
pension system’s rules. This is because in a balanced system the difference between the 
liabilities and current assets is the present value of the future contributions of the 𝑁𝐷𝐶 
system, i.e. the system's contribution asset (taking into account zero financial assets). 
Once the process for obtaining the system’s turnover duration has been developed (see the 
Technical Appendix), the contribution asset is simple to calculate. It is the product of the 
size of the flow per time unit, which in practice is a year, and the expected time between 
payment of contributions and receipt of pensions, which is known as the turnover duration 
(𝑇𝐷).  
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In our model, the 𝑇𝐷 for the system could be interpreted as the number of years expected 
to elapse before the committed liabilities with contributors and pensioners for retirement 
and 𝐿𝑇𝐶  are completely renewed at the current contribution level. Each monetary unit 
enters the system as if it were paid by a contributor of 𝐴𝐶  years and remains within the 
contribution liability until retirement age is reached (pay-in). It is then received by a 
pensioner aged 𝐴𝑟 years. 
In order to preserve the system’s solvency, the asset counterpart for underwriting the 
liabilities caused by NCRs can appear as a special type of public contribution asset 
(PCA_(LTC)) and (PCA_(R)) or as a buffer fund (BF_(LTC)) and (BF_(R)) financed 
by general government revenues. The Japanese AB has included the amount by which the 
state subsidizes the pension system for many years (AAD, 2017). Pérez-Salamero et al. 
(2017) and Metzger (2018) also include state subsidies in several balance sheet frameworks.  
We also find the accumulated deficit (Ad_(R+LTC)) and the losses for the period 
(L_(R+LTC)) on this side. And finally, the total assets are 𝐴𝑡𝑆. The accumulation of losses 
in each period determines the value of the accumulated shortfall at the date of the ABS, 
and “losses in each period” represents the difference between the change in value of the 
liabilities and the change in value of the assets for the period. The loss is also identical to 
the increase in the accumulated deficit or the reduction in the accumulated surplus, 
depending on the situation. 
The entries as shown in Table 1 are detailed in the Technical Appendix. 
2.3.-The income statement: exploring the reasons for the change in financial 
position. 
The ABS and the income statement are interrelated financial statements. In fact, the net 
“gain” for a period can be computed without an income statement. The simplest way to 
determine any change in the system's net worth is by comparing the system's assets and 
liabilities in two consecutive periods, but computing changes in this way means that there 
will be a significant lack of detail.  
Under a present value model, assets and liabilities are measured at present value at each 
reporting date. More importantly, changes in present value are reported in each period as 
income or expenses and are included on the income statement. It can be said that the 
income statement fully explains the reasons behind the changes in the system’s solvency, 
and in our model the reasons are also detailed by type of benefit.  
The proposed structure of the income statement is shown in Table 2, in which it is 
assumed for simplicity’s sake that NCRs are totally guaranteed by the sponsor and that the 
system's administration costs are financed by general taxation. This gain and loss account 
follows the model published by the Swedish authorities, but some modifications need to be 
introduced to adapt it to the NDC model combining retirement and LTC. Unlike in the 
Swedish system, we consider that inheritance gains arising and distributed are perfectly 
matched within the year.   
The formulas for computing the entries are shown in the Technical Appendix.  
The left-hand side (or credit side) of Table 2 lists changes in assets, which need to be 
interpreted in the following way: a negative item (-) decreases the asset and a positive item 
(+) increases it, by the amount shown. 
Table 2: The income statement for an NDC scheme combining retirement and 
LTC contingencies. 
FUND ASSETS (Changes) LIABILITIES (Changes) 
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Pension contributions New pension credit 
Pension disbursements Pension disbursements 
Net return on funded capital Indexation 
CONTRIBUTION ASSET (Changes) Value of change in life expectancy 
Value of change in contribution revenue Value of change in biometric assumptions 
Value of change in turnover duration NET GAIN/LOSS 
Total Total 
The annual change in the fund asset or buffer fund is the result of adding the income from 
contributions to the net return on funded capital and deducting the expenses on pensions. 
Pension contributions are used to pay retirees in the same year. In practice, all pension 
contributions are paid and distributed monthly to the reserve fund. The surpluses or 
deficits that arise when pension contributions are greater or smaller than pension 
disbursements are absorbed by the buffer fund.  
The change in net worth should not be confused with the annual cash deficit or surplus, 
which is the difference between contributions received and pensions paid. Finally, the net 
return on funded capital includes dividends on assets held by the fund and the effects of 
changes in asset prices. In most public pension funds, financial assets are valued at their 
market price on the last trading day of the year. The net return on funded capital can be 
positive or negative depending on the situation of the financial markets.  
On the debit side we see the changes in the contribution asset broken down into 
contribution revenue and turnover duration. The value of the change in contribution 
revenue is the monetary value in terms of how much more (or less) liability can be financed 
by a higher (or lower) level of contributions relative to the preceding year (Settergren, 
2013).      
The value of the change in the 𝑇𝐷 is a combined effect of a variety of causes, given that 
this measure synthesizes into a single number a great deal of information about the 
system’s rules, the age distribution of the population, the age patterns of the labour supply 
and earnings, mortality and disability rates and the design structure of the uplifts (see 
Technical Appendix).  
On the credit side we find the changes in pension liabilities. The associated items need to 
be interpreted as follows: a negative item (-) decreases the pension liability and a positive 
item (+) increases it, by the amount shown. 
New pension credits are accumulated in the notional accounts, and this accounting item is 
identical to income from contributions – the equality between contributions paid and new 
pension credits is (or should be) a key feature of an NDC scheme. Because pension 
payments are an amortization of the pension liability, that liability is reduced by the amount 
of the expenses on pensions. Obviously the amount of the pension disbursements matches 
on both sides of the income statement. 
Changes in pension liabilities due to the indexation of notional accounts and benefits in 
payment are also accounted for. The pension liability can be increased by the value of 
indexation as long as the yearly notional rate is positive. Under an adverse economic trend, 
if the annual notional rate were negative, the pension liability would be reduced.  
The “value of change in life expectancy” entry is for the annual update of life expectancy. 
This item is coherent with the accounting principle of updating the main data on an annual 
basis. Increased life expectancy not only adds to the pension liability, it also changes the 
pension liability’s structure (the time profile of payments) in a way that does not need to be 
fully financed in a PAYG pension system (Settergren, 2013). The net effect of increases in 
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life expectancy in an NDC scheme is an increased pension liability minus the increased 
value of the contribution flow that results from a higher turnover duration (Settergren and 
Mikula, 2005; Vidal-Meliá and Boado-Penas, 2013; Ventura-Marco and Vidal-Meliá, 2014, 
2016). 
The “value of change in biometric assumptions” entry mainly refers to the LTC 
contingency. Changes in transition probabilities and unhealthy life expectancy have 
implications for the value of the liabilities to contributors for LTC (see Technical 
Appendix). The situation could vary dramatically from country to country. Three broad 
scenarios have been suggested in the specialized literature for the future course of mortality 
and morbidity in developed countries: compression, expansion and dynamic equilibrium. 
Assuming a future compression of morbidity due to an expected general decrease in its 
incidence due to, for example, healthier lifestyles, technological and medical advances or 
interventions in the primary and secondary prevention of diseases, we could see a reduction 
in LTC pension liability. Two countries in which this situation already applies are the US 
and Germany. Stallard (2016) finds a very substantial and highly statistically significant 
compression of morbidity for both males and females in the US over the period 1984–
2004. Similarly, Kreft and Doblhammer (2016), using administrative census data on all 
beneficiaries from the Statutory LTC Insurance 2001–2009, find compression of life years 
with severe care need for Germany. 
Under the most pessimistic scenario, i.e. the expansion of morbidity, the LTC pension 
liability would increase year by year, given that the general survival progress and later-active 
(or even missing) improvements in sickness prevention and recovery lead to an increasing 
duration of morbidity and a higher prevalence of health limitations. To give some real 
examples of countries in which this situation applies, we could single out Brazil and Spain. 
Gonçalves et al. (2014) conclude that the expansion of morbidity is an ongoing process in 
the elderly population of the city of São Paulo (Brazil), based on data for the period 2000-
2010. And for the case of Catalonia (Spain), Solé-Auré and Alcañiz (2015) find an 
expansion of morbidity after analysing data for the period 1994 to 2011. 
Under a neutral scenario, which Manton (1982) termed dynamic equilibrium, both length 
of life and healthy years of life increase in such a way that the proportion of healthy years 
of life to total length of life is constant. Therefore, the health status of a population does 
not change and we could see stability in LTC pension liability. Graham et al. (2004) find 
that this scenario provides the best fit to evidence on changes in population health in New 
Zealand. 
We should bear in mind that quantifying the value of change in biometric assumptions is 
no easy task, given that obtaining timely and accurate estimates of mortality, transition and 
incidence rates is highly complex for technical reasons (Robinson, 1996; Hariyanto et al.; 
2014a, 2014b; Fong et al. 2015; Ai et al. 2017). In many countries the lack of biometric data 
could make it impossible to obtain regular representative estimates of functional status 
transition rates. 
On the credit side we could have included another item known as the “value of change in 
discount rate (𝐺)”, but in line with the reference model this was ruled out. For the case of 
an already-functioning DB pension system, Ventura-Marco and Vidal-Meliá (2014) 
discussed four options when choosing the value of 𝐺 for discounting pensions in payment  
The most suitable option for an already-functioning NDC scheme would be to use an 
estimated value of G based on the most recently observed data (the previous 3 or 5 years), 
which is in keeping with the principle that assets and liabilities are valued mainly on the 
basis of events and transactions that are verifiable at the time of valuation. In practice, the 
introduction of this item would increase the volatility of the system’s results and could 
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trigger (unnecessarily) the automatic balance mechanism (ABM) 18 , which is a set of 
predetermined measures established by law to be applied immediately as required according 
to an indicator that reflects the system’s financial health19.  
Finally, in order to balance the income statement, the net gain or loss for the year is 
accounted for on the liability side. A positive value, if the debit items exceed the credit 
items in value, indicates that the system has increased its net wealth, i.e. there are gains for 
the period. A negative value, if the credit items exceed the debit items in value, means that 
the net wealth has decreased, i.e. there are losses for the period. 
  
18 Börsch-Supan (2007) calls these ABMs rational mechanisms and points out that they are transparent 
because it is clear how adjustments will be made and who will bear what costs when an adjustment occurs. 
Interested readers can also consult the papers by Vidal-Meliá et al. (2009 and 2010) and Alonso-García et al. 
(2018). 
19 The introduction of the “Value of change in discount rate” into the income statement could call for a 
different ABM with the inclusion of a no-action range for the balance ratio in order to avoid an excessive 
mumber of triggers. If the solvency indicator fell outside this range, the ABM could restore it to within the 
no-action range (Ma, 2017). This problem and the design of the range of balancing actions clearly goes 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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3. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION 
This section shows the results obtained for a numerical example representative of the 
model developed above. It is divided into two parts. The first shows the ABS under the 
mature state assumption, while the second shows the annual changes in the system’s 
financial position via the income statement for an already-functioning pure NDC pension 
system. 
The numerical example is presented to make it easier for the reader to understand how the 
proposed model for financial reporting functions and what its main advantages and 
disadvantages are. However, it should be viewed simply as an illustration because it uses a 
standardized population by age and the proposed scheme is not yet in operation in any 
country. 
a) The Swedish ABS for an NDC scheme combining retirement and LTC 
contingencies 
Our starting point is the numerical example developed by Vidal-Meliá et al. (2018) for 
retirement and LTC. The effect of introducing a minimum pension on the system's 
financial status is also analysed.   
The main assumptions, which have been made as simple but as realistic as possible, are 
listed below. 
1.-It is assumed that individuals can join the labour market from age 16 onwards, that the 
credited contribution rate is constant and equal to 16%, and that the fixed retirement age 
for all individuals is 65.  
2.-A concave income profile typical of developed countries is assumed. We also assume 
that the contribution bases (𝑔) grow at an annual cumulative rate of 1.6% and that the 
economically active population of all ages (𝛾) grows at an annual rate of 1%.  
3.-It is also assumed that the initial pension benefit remains constant over time in real 
terms, i.e. 𝛼 = 0, using price indexation of benefits. 
4.-As far as the LTC contingency is concerned, the data used to perform this numerical 
example are obtained from Robinson’s (1996) model, which provides seven health states 
that differ according to three variables: the number of IADLs impaired, the number of 
ADLs impaired, and whether there is a cognitive impairment.  
Table 3 gives detailed information about life expectancy in years at age 65 and the 
percentage of total life expectancy likely to be spent in each of the health states. We see 
that healthy pensioners at age 65 will average 4.17 years of ADL disability or cognitive 
impairment over the rest of their lives, i.e. 25.52% of their remaining life expectancy (16.35 
years) is expected to be in some state of dependence.  
We need to remember that the biometric data used for the numerical example have a 
strong effect on the main values that make up the system's equilibrium. To give a couple of 
examples, data obtained from Friedberg et al. (2014) for the US indicate that the percentage 
of life expectancy likely to be spent in states of dependence will average 3.22 years, i.e. 
21.11% of remaining life expectancy (15.26 years at age 65). If we use data from Hariyanto 
et al. (2014a, 2014b) for Australia, the figures would be different – for pensioners at age 65, 
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the percentage of life expectancy likely to be spent in states of dependence20 would average 
8.17 years, i.e. 42.99% of remaining life expectancy (18.99 years).  
Table 3: Life expectancy in years at age 65 and percentage of life expectancy 
likely to be spent in each of the health states  
Starting 
status Ending status 
States 𝒓 𝒅𝟏 𝒅𝟐 𝒅𝟑 𝒅𝟒 𝒅𝟓 𝒅𝟔 Total 
𝒓 12.18 1.84 0.49 0.14 0.35 0.72 0.62 16.35  74.48 11.26 2.99 0.86 2.16 4.43 3.82 100% 
𝒅𝟏 
4.80 0.99 0.28 0.52 1.05 0.91 8.55 
56.16 11.61 3.27 6.06 12.25 10.65 100% 
𝒅𝟐 
3.96 0.41 0.96 0.88 0.87 7.08 
55.99 5.81 13.54 12.37 12.29 100% 
𝒅𝟑 
2.99 1.64 0.43 1.23 6.29 
47.51 26.05 6.79 19.64 100% 
𝒅𝟒 
3.66 0.10 1.05 4.81 
75.85 1.88 22.27 100% 
𝒅𝟓 
5.74 2.35 8.10 
70.94 29.06 100% 
𝒅𝟔 
4.52 4.52 
100.00 100% 
Source: Own based on Robinson (1996)  
Table 3 also shows that the expected number of years allocated to the possible range of 
health states depends on the starting status by age. For pensioners in state 𝑑4  (the 
individual has three or more impaired ADLs but no cognitive impairment), estimated life 
expectancy is only 4.81 years, and it is expected that 24.15% of their remaining life will be 
spent in a worse state of dependence (𝑑5 and 𝑑6). 
Generally speaking, the percentage of total life expectancy likely to be spent in poor health 
increases with age.  
5.-The scheme uses EPAs, in which the uplifts are financed by a reduction – with respect 
to basic pension b – of the benefit paid while the pensioner is healthy. 
6.-In line with the predefined states of dependence, Table 4 shows the (arbitrary) uplifts (𝜉𝑖𝑗) to be applied according to the transitions between the various states that are taken 
into account in the numerical example. 
Table 4: Uplifts (𝜉𝑖𝑗) to be applied when the pensioner moves to a worse health 
state. 
Starting status, 𝑖 Ending status, 𝑗 
𝒅𝟏 𝒅𝟐 𝒅𝟑 𝒅𝟒 𝒅𝟓 𝒅𝟔 
Able (𝒓) 0.250 0.500 0.750 1.000 1.250 1.500 
𝒅𝟏 0.00 0.200 0.400 0.600 0.800 1.000 
𝒅𝟐 0.00 0.167 0.333 0.500 0.667 
𝒅𝟑 0.00 0.143 0.286 0.429 
𝒅𝟒 0.00 0.125 0.250 
𝒅𝟓 0.00 0.111 
20 Their model considers five health states: one healthy and four dependent (with core activity limitation in 
their terminology). 
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𝒅𝟔 0.00 
Source: Vidal-Meliá et al. (2018) 
The rows and columns of the matrix embedded in Table 4 refer to the starting and ending 
health status respectively of each pensioner in the cohort. For example, when a healthy 
person becomes dependent at level 3 (𝑟,𝑑3), the amount of the retirement pension will be 
75% higher than before, given that  𝜉𝑟3 = 0.75, whereas the amount of the benefit will be 
25% higher when a level 4 dependent makes a transition to level 6 (𝑑4,𝑑6). 
If we were to put this model into practice, the design structure of the uplifts would be a key 
element of the system. If the EPA approach were implemented, a large uplift would mean a 
big reduction in the initial retirement benefit. A crucial step prior to establishing the 
structure of uplifts for a given country would be to calculate the average yearly cost of care 
according to the level of severity of dependence and the type of care provided. It would 
also be very important to take into account the cost-sharing or copayment requirements for 
a given country. However, this goes beyond the scope of this paper, since we are 
presenting a numerical example to serve only as an illustration. 
Table 5 presents the main values that make up the system's equilibrium. 
Table 5: NDC system with retirement and graded LTC annuities (𝑁𝐷𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐶): 
some selected values. 
Items System R LTC 𝒅𝟏 𝒅𝟐 𝒅𝟑 𝒅𝟒 𝒅𝟓 𝒅𝟔 
1 (𝜽𝒕 = 𝜽𝒂)% 16.00 13.93 2.07 0.34 0.17 0.07 0.25 0.63 0.61 
2 (𝝀�𝒙𝒅𝒋  >65)* 100 73.70 26.30 11.61 3.09 0.89 2.22 4.57 3.92 
3 𝑨𝑭(𝟔𝟓)𝑳𝑻𝑪(𝟔) 15.2593 10.4582 4.8011 1.6320 0.4949 0.1634 0.4674 1.0779 0.9655 
4 𝒅𝒓𝒕 0.2722 0.2048 0.0674 0.0297 0.0079 0.0023 0.0057 0.0117 0.0101 
5 𝒇𝒓𝒕 0.5878 0.6803 0.3069 0.1151 0.2188 0.3229 0.4297 0.5364 0.6024 
6 ∗ (𝜽𝒕 = 𝜽𝒂)% 16.00 10.97 5.03 1.71 0.52 0.17 0.49 1.13 1.01 
7 𝒇𝒓𝒕* 0.5878 0.5355 0.7468 0.5755 0.6564 0.7534 0.8594 0.9656 1.0041 
8 𝜽𝒕∗% 12.68 11.04 1.64 0.27 0.14 0.06 0.19 .50 0.48 
9 𝑫𝒆𝒕% 26.18 
10 𝑻𝑫𝒕  33.44 32.53 39.59 36.67 38.64 39.26 39.29 39.35 41.93 
11 ∗ 𝑻𝑫𝒕  33.44 30.95 38.87 36.67 38.64 39.26 39.29 39.35 41.93 
12 𝑨𝒓  74.49 73.58 80.64 77.72 79.69 80.31 80.34 80.40 82.98 
13 ∗ 𝑨𝒓  74.49 72.00 79.92 77.72 79.69 80.31 80.34 80.40 82.98 
14 𝑨𝒄  41.05 
15 𝒙�𝒕  64 
16 𝒑𝒕𝒄  22.95 
17 𝒑𝒕𝒓  10.49 9.58 16.64 13.72 15.69 16.31 16.34 16.40 18.98 
18 *𝒑𝒕𝒓  10.49 8.00 15.92 13.72 15.69 16.31 16.34 16.40 18.98 
Source: Own based on Vidal-Meliá et al. (2018) 
*This symbol indicates that the selected value has been calculated under the assumption that the total 
benefits paid to dependent persons are accounted as pension costs attributed to the LTC contingency 
The first item shows that the balanced contribution rate (𝜃𝑡) coincides with the credited 
contribution rate (𝜃𝑎). Also shown is the contribution rate assigned to each contingency, 
assuming that the criterion for allocating pension costs is the extra benefit paid to the 
pensioner when a healthy person becomes dependent. The contribution rate assigned to 
each state of dependence depends on the size of the uplift (Table 4) and the LTC 
prevalence rates (the quotient between the number of dependent persons and the number 
of pensioners(?̅?𝑥𝑑𝑗), i.e. item 2), which are determined by the biometric assumptions. 
Item 3 shows the value of the annuity factor for the NDC scheme with LTC coverage. For 
a given pension balance, this divisor determines the initial retirement benefit (see formula 
[1.] in the Technical Appendix). 
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Items 4 and 5 show the value for the demographic ratio, i.e. the quotient between the 
number of pensioners and the number of contributors (𝑑𝑟𝑡), and the financial ratio, i.e. the 
quotient between the average pension and the average contribution base, ( 𝑓𝑟𝑡) , 
respectively. The system is in equilibrium because the product of both ratios equals the 
contribution rate. In the mature state, the contributor-pensioner ratio is 3.67 (the inverse of 
the demographic ratio) and the system’s average replacement rate is 58.78%. 
Items 6 and 7 replicate items 1 and 5 respectively, under the assumption that the total 
benefits paid to dependent persons are accounted as pension costs attributed to the LTC 
contingency. In this case the contribution rate assigned to each status is higher than before. 
This provides us with a more informative value of the financial ratio by contingency. 
Naturally the system’s average replacement rate remains unchanged, but the average 
replacement rates for dependence and retirement do not. Such results make sense because 
the worse the health status, the higher the average replacement rate. 
Item 8 shows that if the survivor dividend had not been included when calculating the 
initial retirement pension, a discrepancy would have arisen between the credited 
contribution rate of 16% and the rate necessary to finance the system, 𝜃𝑡∗, which in this 
case is 12.68%. The impact of the dividend effect (item 9) on the initial pension is by no 
means irrelevant, and the initial retirement pension rises by 26.18% using the mortality 
structure for the US derived from Robinson’s model. 
Even more important as far as the aim of this paper is concerned are the values for the 
turnover duration and how they break down (item 10 onwards).  
As item 10 shows, the 𝑇𝐷  for LTC in the integrated scheme (39.59 years) is notably 
different from the base system's 𝑇𝐷 (33.44 years), and this comes about mainly because the 
prevalence rates for the most severe dependence states are particularly high for the very 
elderly. It is calculated assuming that only the uplifts with respect to the pure retirement 
pension paid to dependent persons are accounted as pension costs attributed to the LTC 
contingency. 
Under the assumption that the total benefits paid to dependent persons are accounted as 
pension costs attributed to the LTC contingency (item 11), the 𝑇𝐷 for LTC (38.87 years) is 
slightly different from that reported by item 10. However, the base system's 𝑇𝐷 (33.44 
years) remains unchanged because the weighted average ages of contributors and 
pensioners and the pay-in and pay-out periods do not change irrespective of the accounting 
rules used to record the expenses due to the LTC contingency (see Technical Appendix). 
It is easy to check that the system's 𝑇𝐷  is a weighted average of the 𝑇𝐷𝑠  for the 
contingencies, since the weighting element is the contribution rate per contingency. This is 
true regardless of the accounting criterion used for recording the disbursements for LTC 
benefits.  
Our example is not far from reality because the resulting values for the turnover duration – 
between 32.53 and 30.95 years for the pure retirement contingency – do not differ to any 
great extent from those reported for the contribution asset as calculated by the Swedish 
authorities. For the period 2012-2016 (TSPS, 2017), the 𝑇𝐷 has ranged from 31.50 to 30.13 
years. It could be shorter or longer depending on the biometric assumptions and the uplifts 
applied. In this and many other ways, the 𝑇𝐷 will reflect the design of any particular NDC 
scheme (see Technical Appendix). 
Finally, the breakdown of the system's 𝑇𝐷 into its principal elements (the pay-in and pay-
out periods) conveys very important information enabling a rapid assessment of the relative 
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importance of the liabilities to contributors and pensioners. The pay-in is associated with 
the liabilities to contributors, whereas the pay-out is associated with the liabilities to 
pensioners. Given the values estimated for the pay-in and pay-out, it takes no time to 
calculate that the liabilities to contributors as a proportion of total liabilities amount to 
68.63% in this steady state (see Table 7 later in this section). 
Table 6 presents the main entries on the Swedish-type ABS under three scenarios: the 
model with no MPB and two that include MPBs. In these two additional scenarios, the 
pure NDC model is extended from the start by introducing a minimum pension equivalent 
to 𝜓 per cent of the system's average wage. The resulting scheme is now called 𝑁𝐷𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐶𝜓 . 
The MPB is introduced in the two scenarios respectively as 𝜓 = 25%, which could be 
considered as being in line with real pension systems for developed countries, and 𝜓 =75%, an extreme value that could actually change the nature of the NDC scheme. Amounts 
are expressed as a percentage of the total assets of the pure NDC model. 
Table 6: The balanced ABS of the 𝑵𝑫𝑪𝑳𝑻𝑪
𝜓  scheme at the end of year t as a % of the total assets of  
𝑵𝑫𝑪𝑳𝑻𝑪. Some selected values. 
Items 𝑵𝑫𝑪𝑳𝑻𝑪 𝑵𝑫𝑪𝑳𝑻𝑪𝟐𝟓% 𝑵𝑫𝑪𝑳𝑻𝑪𝟕𝟓% 
Assets 
CA_(R)  63.43 63.43 63.43 
BF_(R) 0.00 1.89 (0.49) 14.11 (3.65) 
CA_(LTC) 36.57 36.57 36.57  
BF_(LTC) 0.00 1.09 (0.45) 8.14 (3.34) 
Total 100.00 102.98 (100.94) 122.24 (106.98) 
Liabilities 
Con_(R) 47.03 47.03 47.03 
Con_(R) NCR 0.00 1.40 (0.0) 10.46 (0.0) 
Con_(LTC) 21.59 21.59 21.59 
Con_(LTC) NCR 0.00 0.64 (0.0) 4.80 (0.0) 
Pen_(R) 16.39 16.39 16.39 
Pen_(R) NCR 0.00 0.49 3.65 
Pen_(LTC) 14.98 14.98 14.98 
Pen_(LTC) NCR 0.00 0.45 3.33 
Total  100.00 102.98 (100.94) 122.24 (106.98) 
Indicators 𝑵𝑫𝑪𝑳𝑻𝑪 𝑵𝑫𝑪𝑳𝑻𝑪
𝟐𝟓% 𝑵𝑫𝑪𝑳𝑻𝑪𝟕𝟓% 
R LTC S R LTC S R LTC S 
𝜃𝒂 % 10.97 5.03 16.00 10.97 5.03 16.00 10.97 5.03 16.00 
𝜃𝒕
∗% 10.97 5.03 16.00 11.29 5.18 16.48 13.41 6.15 19.56 
𝜃𝑡
∆% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.15 0.48 2.44 1.12 3.56 
𝑑𝑟𝑡  0.205 0.067 0.272 0.205 0.067 0.272 0.205 0.067 0.272 
𝑓𝑟𝑡  0.535 0.748 0.588 0.552 0.769 0.605 0.655 0.913 0.719 
𝐷𝐹𝑡 % 0.00 2.90 (0.93) 18.20 (6.53) 
𝑆ℎ𝑡 % 0.00 2.98 22.24 
Source: Own.   
NB: The totals will not necessarily equal the sums of the rounded components. 
Other selected indicators are also shown, such as the contribution rates assigned to each 
contingency, the balanced contribution rate (𝜃𝒕∗) and its decomposition as the product of 
the dependency ratio and the financial ratio, the degree of funding, and the system’s 
shortfall due to the introduction of an MPB (as a percentage of the aggregate income from 
contributors, 𝑆ℎ𝑡 %). 
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The indicators shown include the contribution rates assigned to each contingency under 
the assumption that the total benefits paid to dependent persons are accounted as pension 
costs attributed to the LTC contingency. 
The simplified21 ABS for the pure NDC model (𝑵𝑫𝑪𝑳𝑻𝑪) shows that in this (unrealistic) 
state the system's total liabilities match perfectly with the system's total contribution asset, 
since the two integrated contingencies (retirement and LTC) are in financial equilibrium, 
the solvency ratio is obviously equal to one and the degree of funding and the system’s 
shortfall is zero. 
The introduction of an MPB equivalent to 25% of the system's average wage has a very 
limited impact on the system’s financial equilibrium because only a small proportion of 
pensioners are granted this new benefit22. Compared to the pure NDC model, the size of 
the system increases slightly, from 100 to 102.98, or to 100.94 it if were decided not to 
recognize the liabilities to contributors due to NCRs. The buffer fund needed to back up 
the increase in liabilities to contributors and pensioners is very small, 2.98 (0.94), in line 
with a treasury shortfall that barely amounts to 2.98% of the aggregate income from 
contributions. Likewise, the balanced contribution rate (16.48%) is higher than the rate 
credited to contributors (16.00%), in coherence with the very small rise in the system's 
financial ratio (from 0.588 to 0.605). The demographic ratio is obviously not affected by 
the introduction of a minimum pension. 
For the second MPB scenario (𝜓 = 75%), the picture of the system changes considerably. 
The MPB involves a great number of pensioners and the lower the number of years 
contributed, the higher the amount of the supplement that the sponsor would have to pay 
to top up the capital accumulated in the individual accounts 23 . What first draws the 
attention in this scenario is the size of the scheme, 22.24% greater than the benchmark 
(𝑵𝑫𝑪𝑳𝑻𝑪) under the assumption that liabilities to contributors due to NCRs are recognized. 
The substantial MPB causes a huge increase in the liabilities acquired by the system. To 
maintain the system's sustainability, the degree of funding needs to reach a level of 18.20% 
of total liabilities, otherwise the sponsor will have to make payments every year to cover 
the system’s recurrent annual deficit, which amounts to 22.24% of the aggregate income 
from contributions. In other words, the actual disbursement on pensions would mean a 
balanced contribution rate of 19.56% instead of 16.00%. This is a direct consequence of 
altering the system's average replacement rate from its original value (0.535) to its current 
value (0.719). 
If the liabilities to contributors due to NCRs were not recognized, the buffer fund needed 
to back up the increase in liabilities due to NCRs would be smaller, amounting to 6.53% of 
total (recalculated) liabilities. However, the level of payments made by the sponsor would 
remain the same if the public contribution asset alternative were chosen to underwrite the 
liabilities to pensioners originating from NCRs.   
To summarize, in the situation described above with an MPB embedded in an NDC 
scheme combining retirement and LTC contingencies, the promotor – i.e. the state – has 
two options for keeping the system solvent and preserving its transparency. It can either 
21 It is termed simplified or aggregate because the assets and liabilities corresponding to LTC benefits could 
have been reported by level of dependence.  
22 Under the assumptions adopted, only those with fewer than 17 years of contributions would benefit. 
14.72% of pensioners would need to top up the capital accumulated in their individual accounts because the 
balance would be less than the minimum required to finance the EPA at the retirement age. 
23  The minimum pension applies to 34.81% of pensioners, i.e. those with fewer than 44 years of 
contributions. 
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make an extraordinary payment to fully finance the necessary amount of the buffer fund, or 
it can register a claim on the public purse to regularly remove the system shortfall. The 
second option makes it possible to record the public contribution asset on the assets side 
of the ABS. 
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b) Annual changes in the system’s financial position shown via the income 
statement 
When compiling an ABS for an already-functioning system, other elements may be added 
to those shown in Table 1. These could include a buffer fund resulting from an 
accumulation of treasury surpluses (or simply for liquidity resulting from an extraordinary 
contribution made by the sponsor (Ss_(R+LTC)), financial liabilities24 resulting from an 
accumulation of treasury deficits, actuarial deficits resulting from an accumulation of losses, 
or actuarial surpluses resulting from an accumulation of gains.  
Table 7 presents the ABS of a pure 𝑵𝑫𝑪𝑳𝑻𝑪 scheme at the end of years t-1 and t, with 
changes in net worth determined by comparing the system's assets and liabilities in these 
consecutive periods. The table also shows the TD for the system and by contingency, the 
balance ratio (calculated without taking into account the part of the buffer fund 
corresponding to the sponsor’s support), the degree of funding and the liability structure 
ratio (the ratio between the liabilities to contributors and total liabilities). 
Table 7: The ABS of a pure 𝑵𝑫𝑪𝑳𝑻𝑪 scheme at the end of years t and t+1 with changes in net 
worth  
Items/year 𝒕 − 𝟏 𝒕 Variation 
Assets 
BF 11.00 10.89 -0.11 
CA_(R)  63.43 64.06 0.63 
CA_(LTC) 36.57 37.26 0.69 
Ad_(R+LTC) 0 0 0.00 
L_(R+LTC) 0 1.13 1.13 
Total 111 113.35 2.35 
Liabilities and sponsor support (capital) 
Ss_(R+LTC) 10.00 10.00 0.00 
Con_(R) 47.03 48.21 1.18 
Con_(LTC) 21.60 22.10 0.50 
Pen_(R) 16.39 16.80 0.41 
Pen_(LTC) 14.98 15.25 0.27 
As_(R+LTC) 1.00 1.00 0.00 
P_(R+LTC) 0 0 0.00 
Total  111 113.35 2.35 
Solvency, funding and liability structure indicators 
𝑻𝑫𝒕
𝑺  (𝑻𝑫𝒕𝑹;𝑻𝑫𝒕𝑳𝑻𝑪) 33.44 (30.95; 38.87) 33.27 (30.70; 38.88) -0.017 
𝑩𝑹𝒕
𝑺 1.0100 0.9987 -0.0113 
𝑫𝑭𝒕  11.00% 10.64% -0.0036 
𝑳𝑺𝒕  68.63% 68.69% 0.0006 
Source: Own.   
NB: The totals will not necessarily equal the sums of the rounded components. 
At the end of year t-1 the system’s financial position is sound, since the balance ratio is 
greater than one (1.01), i.e. the accumulated surplus is positive. In general terms it can be 
said that this particular system is reasonably solvent, and that therefore at the date of the 
report the participants (contributors and pensioners) should have a realistic expectation of 
receiving the benefits that have been accrued, without the system’s sponsor (the state) 
having to make any extraordinary contributions. Such a statement is made on the 
assumption that the system's rules and the economic and demographic conditions 
prevailing at the time of the valuation remain constant.  
24 This is not allowed in some countries.  
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As can be seen in Table 7, the degree of funding for this system is clearly positive (11%), 
mainly due to sponsor support. This allows for possible annual shortfalls in the system's 
income to be dealt with by selling financial assets. 
At the end of year t the system’s ABS reports a weaker solvency indicator (0.9987), given 
that for this period the system registers losses (1.13) larger than the accumulated surplus 
(1.00). In this situation the accumulated shortfall becomes positive, i.e. the net worth of the 
scheme arrives at a negative figure. A more detailed analysis of the balance ratio (see 
formula [32.] in the Technical Appendix) shows that the LTC contingency presents a ratio 
slightly greater than one (1.0065), while the ratio for retirement is less than one (0.9942).  
In a case where the system’s balance ratio is less than 1, the Swedish NDC system would 
apply its ABM. This is a legislated formula that reduces the notional interest rate credited to 
contributions and the indexation rate for pensions, all with the aim of bringing the assets 
closer to the liabilities. The founders of the Swedish system believed that the issue of 
financial stability in a public pension system was a matter of social policy, since any 
imbalance would have to be paid for by someone at some time. They decided that citizens 
would benefit if the new Swedish public pension plan clearly determined who would pay 
for any financial imbalance and when (Lundberg et al., 2007). 
The reasons for acting sooner rather than later in cases where the solvency indicator shows 
a situation of imbalance are compelling (Munnell, 2017). Early action has important 
implications when it comes to distributing the burden fairly across generations, and 
eliminating the insolvency will maintain people’s faith in the scheme and make them feel 
more secure about retirement and other contingencies. Delaying the steps needed to 
restore full solvency would probably have a negative impact on the government’s credit 
standing (Martell et al., 2013). 
In a pessimistic scenario where the ABM is permanently triggered, there would be no 
assurance that benefit amounts would not fall below accepted levels (Woodall and 
Hagemejer, 2009). This hypothetical problem clearly goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
Returning to Table 7, we see that in this accounting period the system has recorded losses 
because the difference between the increase in assets (1.22) and the increase in liabilities 
(2.35) is negative (-1.13).  
To conclude this part of the numerical example, the detailed changes in the system’s 
financial position are shown on the income statement (Table 8).  
The system has a cash flow deficit because income from contributions falls short of 
pension outlays. This shortfall is absorbed by the buffer fund, but the return on funded 
capital does not cover the entire cash flow deficit. This is also true if we examine the 
change in fund assets by contingency. 
The ratio between pension contributions and pension disbursements is approximately 
95.24%, so the system has a treasury shortfall that amounts to 4.76% of the aggregate 
income from contributions. 
Changes in the contribution asset add net worth to the system (1.33), but the value of the 
change in the system’s turnover duration decreases the asset by the amount shown (-0.51). 
Nevertheless, the value for the LTC contingency is positive, given that its associated TD is 
slightly higher in 𝑡 (38.88) than in 𝑡 − 1 (38.87).   
The analysis of changes in liabilities shows that the pension liability increases mainly with 
the annual indexation of pensions and pension account balances (2.34). Indexation here is 
determined by the change in the growth of the annual wage bill. It can be seen that the 
value of the change in life expectancy also increases the pension liabilities. For the LTC 
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contingency, the value of the change in biometric assumptions shows a positive amount of 
0.03 monetary units, which leads to an increase in LTC pension liabilities. If this trend 
persists over time, it could indicate an expansion of morbidity. The change in net worth is 
the result of all the above, and in this case the system has losses of 1.13 monetary units. 
Given that the system had an accumulated surplus (also known as the opening results 
brought forward) of 1 monetary unit, then the closing results brought forward (or the 
system’s net worth) amounts to -0.13 monetary units. 
Table 8: The income statement for the period t-1, t  
ITEMS System R LTC 
FUND ASSET (Changes) -0.11 -0.07 -0.04 
Pension contributions 3.05 2.09 0.96 
Pension disbursements -3.20 -2.19 -1.01 
Return on funded capital 0.04 0.03 0.01 
CONTRIBUTION ASSET (Changes) 1.33 0.63 0.69 
Value of change in contribution revenue 1.83 1.15 0.69 
Value of change in turnover duration -0.50 -0.51 0.01 
Total DEBIT SIDE 1.22 0.56 0.65 
LIABILITIES (Changes) 2.35 1.59 0.77 
New pension credit 3.05 2.09 0.96 
Pension disbursements -3.20 -2.19 -1.01 
Indexation 2.34 1.56 0.79 
Value of change in life expectancy 0.13 0.13 -0.00 
Value of change in biometric assumptions 0.03 0.00 0.03 
NET WORTH (change) -1.13 -1.02 -0.11 
Total CREDIT SIDE 1.22 0.57 0.66 
Source: Own. 
NB: The totals will not necessarily equal the sums of the rounded components. 
To summarize, changes in net worth in this type of NDC scheme are affected by economic 
and demographic factors and by financial markets if the system has a reserve fund. The 
main factor in the short term would usually be growth in employment and the contribution 
base, but demographic factors would be far more important in the long term.  
If the degree of funding were large enough, the effect of major changes in the financial 
markets would also be very significant in the short term. This was the case with the 
Swedish NDC system in 2008. The main reason for the year’s negative result was the 
decrease in the buffer fund assets due to the severe crisis that affected the world’s financial 
markets. The main consequence was that the balance ratio dropped below 1.0000 for the 
first time, and this was reflected in pensioners’ pockets and contributors’ pension accounts 
from 2009 to 2010 (TSPS, 2009). Pensioners with only a guaranteed minimum pension or a 
low benefit were unaffected.  
4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are solid reasons for proposing to link old-age income and LTC policy in the public 
pension system. LTC finance needs to be considered as part of an overall retirement 
strategy rather than as a simple extension of health insurance, and the rationale behind all 
pension arrangements is to provide an adequate income to meet needs in retirement 
regardless of a person’s state of health. For most retirement planners, retirement and LTC 
often go hand-in-hand and the combination of both contingencies is a way of improving 
the spread of LTC social insurance coverage. In addition, pooling the longevity risk 
(associated with pure retirement benefit) and the morbidity risk (associated with the 
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unhealthy states of the beneficiaries) should result in a more efficient scheme due to the 
lower overall risk, since both risks work in opposite directions. 
In OECD countries there are significant concerns about the sustainability of financing 
LTC services and other assistance for the elderly (Swartz, 2013). This is not surprising 
given that an increased demand for LTC services (and an increase in associated costs) is 
forecast in various countries including the UK, Germany, Spain, Italy, Japan, Canada, Chile, 
the US and China, to name just a few (De la Maisonneuve and Oliveira Martins, 2013; 
Worrall and Chaussalet, 2015). 
In short, it is difficult to hide the real importance of this subject, i.e. the link between 
retirement and LTC contingencies and the need to find the right balance between fair 
protection and financial sustainability in the long term¸ but without shifting too large a 
financial burden onto future generations.  
The idea of combining the retirement and LTC contingencies embedded in an NDC 
scheme and using CFC benefits to help pensioners to cope with the cost of LTC is in line 
with beneficiary choice and flexibility, which are increasingly important goals in modern 
LTC systems. This proposal aims to provide financial sustainability in the long term and 
enhance intergenerational equality. 
With all the above reasons in mind, this paper has developed the necessary technicalities to 
present a Swedish-type financial reporting statement for an NDC scheme embedding LTC 
insurance within the retirement pension system. The articles by Pérez-Salamero et al. (2017) 
and Vidal-Meliá et al. (2018) and the current financial report of the Swedish NDC scheme 
(TSPS, 2017) were the cornerstones enabling the paper's aim to be achieved.  
The proposed social insurance accounting model, in line with the principle of separating 
the distributional aspects of social policy from the contributory aspect of the NDC scheme, 
splits the system into two parts: the pure NDC part and the redistributive part, which 
includes the assets and liabilities originating from NCRs. The paper has shown that, in 
theory at least, an NDC system combining retirement and LTC would be financially sound, 
i.e. the proposed model as a whole is coherent. In a mature state, the balance ratio indicates 
that the amount of the system’s assets perfectly matches the amount of the system’s 
liabilities. It is also shown that prefunding and sustainability are not necessarily linked.  
In the specific case of an NDC that includes an MPB, in order to keep the system 
sustainable and preserve its transparency, the asset side of the balance sheet should include 
a corresponding counterpart to cover the commitments to pensioners and contributors due 
to NCR rights. Two valid options have been explored. These involve either making an 
extraordinary contribution to fully finance the necessary amount of the buffer fund or 
registering a claim on the public purse to regularly remove the system’s shortfall, and this 
second option makes it possible to record the public contribution asset on the assets side 
of the ABS. The use of a buffer fund has the advantage of forcing politicians to guarantee 
pension promises made in the shape of MPBs, since the higher the level of the stipulated 
MPB, the higher the degree of funding needed to maintain the system's financial 
equilibrium. 
The paper has also shown that this social insurance accounting methodology, based on a 
present value model, is valid when it comes to measuring the scheme’s financial health over 
time by means of the balance ratio. This income statement contains very useful information 
about the demographic and economic factors affecting the change in the system’s net 
worth by contingency. This is very valuable information for stakeholders. 
In line with the reference model, TSPS (2017), our proposed way of measuring the pension 
system’s assets and liabilities has several advantages – it has a high degree of transparency 
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and needs no complicated projections of economic, financial or demographic variables, 
which could easily have a bias effect on the sustainability and solvency indicators 
(Settergren 2013). Anyone with any knowledge of financial matters can understand the 
ABS and the way it expresses the pension system’s financial situation (Boado-Penas and 
Vidal-Meliá, 2013). 
To a certain extent the ABS is easy to compile because it is based on a simple process of 
calculating both the assets from contributions and the liabilities to pensioners and 
contributors (from the amounts accumulated in their individual notional accounts). In this 
regard, we should bear in mind that in the context of academic analysis and research, 
complex models and frameworks with various assumptions and sensitivity analyses may be 
suitable. However, in the context of practical rules and real policy, the frameworks may 
need to be designed to be more straightforward and simple (Wendorff, 2010). 
Finally, no projections need to be made when compiling the ABS, so the possibly endless 
debates as to their accuracy are avoided. Applying the necessary adjustment should not give 
rise to any discussion unless the reasons for applying the ABM are temporary and easily 
reversed.  
The main disadvantage of the approach is that it is not sensitive to economic and 
demographic uncertainty. Because the ABS is based on verifiable facts and transactions at 
the date on which it is compiled, no projections are carried out and therefore no 
demographic or economic threats to the system are taken into account. However, this 
problem can easily be overcome in the same way as in Sweden, where projections are made 
of the actuarial balance itself, although these are never used to decide whether or not to 
activate the ABM (TSPS, 2017). 
On the practical side, the numerical illustration we present can to a great extent be 
considered realistic for several reasons. The model works simultaneously with 49 and 37 
generations of contributors and pensioners respectively and takes into account the effect of 
the survivor dividend on the system's financial equilibrium. The pensioners’ health statuses 
have been divided into seven different states based on accurate biometric data, given that 
publicly-run LTC schemes recognize at least three degrees of dependence. Moreover, the 
resulting values for the turnover duration do not differ greatly from those reported by the 
Swedish authorities.  
The example we develop adds value to the paper because it sheds light on the main 
differences with the benchmark model (TSPS, 2017), which only includes the retirement 
contingency. The results make sense and provide us with some useful values regarding the 
impact of introducing a minimum pension on the system's financial equilibrium. 
Furthermore, the example clearly shows that this accounting framework integrates both 
contributory and social aspects of public pensions and discloses the real cost of 
redistribution through minimum pensions.  
Ignoring the fact that the proposed scheme is not yet in force in any country, another 
valuable lesson to be drawn from the numerical illustration is that putting the model into 
practice would demand accurate annual estimates of mortality, transition and incidence 
rates, which is highly complex for technical reasons and/or due to the lack of reliable data.  
To conclude, the paper stresses the need for the proper reporting of social insurance 
benefits to enhance transparency and sustainability and improve decision-making, all of 
which is in the public interest. It shows that the relationship between this accounting 
framework and ABMs comes about naturally. When the solvency indicator reveals that the 
system’s balance ratio is less than 1, the logical step is to trigger the ABM to restore 
solvency as soon as possible. 
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Finally, considering the model presented here, one direction for future research would be 
to extend this accounting framework to cover a more comprehensive NDC scheme 
combining retirement, LTC and permanent disability. To do this, however, a preliminary 
(difficult) step would involve designing this new proposed NDC scheme, which would 
necessarily be a time-consuming task.  
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
The basics of the model: The accounting framework for organizing, summarizing and 
interpreting data on transfer systems and the life cycle developed in Arthur and McNicoll 
(1978), Lee (1980, 1994a and 1994b) and Willis (1988) combined with the standard double-
entry bookkeeping method can be considered the structural basis of this paper. 
Arthur and McNicoll (1978) integrated mathematical demography into the Samuelson 
model and highlighted the importance of the age profiles of labour income and 
consumption, a theme continued in Lee (1980). Willis (1988) derived some key accounting 
identities and comparative static results, and then Lee (1994a and 1994b) further developed 
the Willis model. 
The papers cited above along with the seminal work by Samuelson (1958), who introduced 
overlapping generation models into economics and highlighted the importance of 
intergenerational transfers, are the basis of the so-called national transfer accounts. This 
methodology provides a coherent accounting framework of economic flows from one age 
group or generation to another, typically for a national population in a given calendar year 
(UNPD, 2013). 
The ‘Italian method’ of double-entry bookkeeping is the foundation for modern 
accounting (Sangster, 2016). It can be defined as “that system by which every transaction 
involving a transfer of money or money’s worth is recorded in two separated parts of a 
series, not merely by way of repetition, but so as to record the two distinct aspects in which 
every such transaction is capable of being regarded” (Hartley, 1987). 
This paper combines the above accounting framework with a multiple state transition 
model (Haberman and Pitacco, 1999; Pitacco, 2014), which describes a subject's 
movements between a set of various states: contributors (active) (𝑎), retired (healthy) (𝑟), 
retired (𝑗 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑛}-level dependent) (𝑑𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑛}), and deceased (𝑓). 
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From a pension mathematics point of view, the model for calculating the annuity factors 
can be seen as a multi-state non-homogeneous 25  discrete Markov process, {𝑆(𝑡), 𝑡 ∈
ℤ+}, where 𝑆(𝑡) is the random variable that represents the process state at time 𝑡  with 
values in a finite state space, 𝒮 = {𝑎, 𝑟,𝑑1, … … ,𝑑𝑛,𝑓}, with just one state at any time and 
a set of direct possible unidirectional ordered pair transitions  
𝒯 = � (𝑎, 𝑟), (𝑎,𝑓), (𝑟,𝑑1), … … , (𝑟,𝑑𝑛), (𝑟,𝑓), (𝑑1,𝑑2), … . … . . … , (𝑑1,𝑑𝑛), (𝑑1,𝑓),(𝑑2,𝑑3), … … … … . … , (𝑑2,𝑑𝑛), (𝑑2,𝑓), … … . … … , (𝑑𝑛−1,𝑑𝑛), (𝑑𝑛−1,𝑓), (𝑑𝑛,𝑓)�. 
In this type of process, transition probabilities depend only on the current state of the 
process. Therefore pair (𝒮,𝒯) is the multiple state model used. It can be said that this 
framework modelled using Markov assumptions enables the easy computation of relevant 
probabilities and expected values. 
In short, our approach can be termed a multiple overlapping generations model (MOLG), 
which is the cornerstone of our accounting framework and enables us to compute the 
percentage of the retired population receiving LTC benefits in a mature state. To a large 
extent the model includes realistic demography because it takes into account an age and 
health status schedule of mortality, the uncertainty that surrounds the timing of becoming 
dependent (LTC incidence rates by age) and yearly deterioration probabilities by age 
(probabilities of moving to a worse state of dependence). It also allows for changes in 
population and for a large number of generations of contributors and pensioners (active 
and dependent persons classified by their degree of LTC needs) to coexist at each moment 
in time. 
Determining the average initial pension (pure NDC scheme): The average initial 
benefit (with survivor dividend) for an individual aged 𝑥𝑒 + 𝐴  in year 𝑡,  enhanced by 
percentages {𝜉𝑟1, 𝜉𝑟2, … , 𝜉𝑟𝑛}  if the healthy person becomes dependent, 𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑁𝐷𝐶 , can be 
expressed as:  
𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑁𝐷𝐶 = 𝐾�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑎𝑐𝐴𝐹(𝑥𝑒+𝐴)𝐿𝑇𝐶(𝑛) =
𝐾(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑇𝑎𝑐
𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)
?̈?𝑥𝑒+𝐴
𝑟𝛼 + ∑ 𝐴𝑥𝑒+𝐴𝑟𝑑𝑗𝛼𝜉𝑟𝑗𝑛𝑗=1  [1.] 
where:  𝑥𝑒 : is the earliest age of entry into the system. The age giving entitlement to retirement 
pension is 𝑥𝑒 + 𝐴.  
𝐾�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑎𝑐 = 𝐾(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑇𝑎𝑐𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) : is the average accumulated notional capital at time 𝑡 for individuals 
aged 𝑥𝑒 + 𝐴. 
𝐴𝐹(𝑥𝑒+𝐴)𝐿𝑇𝐶(𝑛): is the annuity factor of the system with LTC coverage (this expression is fully 
developed in the paper by Pla-Porcel et al. (2017) for a more general case including the 
possibility of recovery). 
𝐾(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑇𝑎𝑐 =𝜃𝑎 · ∑ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝑘,𝑘+𝑡−𝐴) · 𝑦(𝑥𝑒+𝑘,𝑘+𝑡−𝐴) · (1 + 𝐺)𝐴−𝑘𝐴−1𝑘=0 : is the total accumulated 
notional capital at time t for all individuals who reach age 𝑥𝑒 + 𝐴. 
25 It is non-homogeneous if we take into account the age of the individuals. 
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𝑦(𝑥𝑒+𝑘,𝑘+𝑡−𝐴):  is the average wage (contribution base). 
𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡): is the number of contributors at time 𝑡 for individuals aged 𝑥𝑒 + 𝐴. 
?̈?𝑥𝑒+𝐴
𝑟𝛼 : is the present value at age 𝑥𝑒 + 𝐴 of 1 monetary unit of a lifetime pension payable 
in advance while the individual is healthy, indexed at rate 𝛼 with a technical interest rate 
equal to 𝐺.  
𝐴𝑥𝑒+𝐴
𝑟𝑑𝑗𝛼𝜉𝑟𝑗 : is the present actuarial value, for a healthy person aged 𝑥𝑒 + 𝐴, of the graded 
LTC annuity or enhanced pension that supplements 1 monetary unit of the initial 
retirement pension by percentage 𝜉𝑟𝑗, where 𝑗 ∈ {1,2, . .𝑛} and 0 < 𝜉𝑟1 < 𝜉𝑟2 < ⋯ < 𝜉𝑟𝑛. 
The enhanced benefits are paid from the moment the healthy person becomes dependent 
and for as long as they remain in a state of dependence. 
The average initial pension with a minimum pension benefit: The amount of the 
initial retirement pension awarded to pensioners in year 𝑡 is the highest of either the benefit 
computed according to formula [1.]  �𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑁𝐷𝐶 �  or the minimum pension, �𝑃�(𝑦� ,𝑡)𝑀𝑖𝑛�: 
𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 �𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝑟] ,𝑃�(𝑦� ,𝑡)𝑀𝑖𝑛[𝑟]� [2.] 
For the following years, assuming that all pensions are indexed at the same rate and that 
𝑘 ∈ {1, 2  ,…,𝜔 − (𝑥𝑒 + 𝐴)} , the benefit will depend on the health status of the 
pensioner, 𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘,𝑡+𝑘) = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 �𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘,𝑡+𝑘)𝑁𝐷𝐶[Ω] ,𝑃�(𝑦� ,𝑡+𝑘)𝑀𝑖𝑛[Ω]�, where Ω ∈ {𝑟,𝑑1,⋯ ,𝑑𝑛}, and 
where, because a higher level of LTC means greater expense for the annuitant, the amount 
of the minimum pension in the case of LTC need is fully linked to retirement.  
With population growth of 𝛾 > 0, there are 𝐴 different contribution pathways that will 
determine 𝐴 different pensions, since contributors might be working for 1 year, 2 years…, 
𝐴 years.  
𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) = �𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑐,𝑡)𝐴
𝑐=1
  ;    𝐾(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑎𝑐𝑇 = �𝐾(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑐,𝑡)𝑎𝑐𝐴
𝑐=1
· 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑐,𝑡) [3.] 
where, 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑐,𝑡) : is the number of individuals who retire at age 𝑥𝑒 + 𝐴 and have been 
contributing for the last 𝑐 years at time 𝑡. 
𝐾(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑐,𝑡)𝑎𝑐 : is the accumulated notional capital at time 𝑡 for one individual aged 𝑥𝑒 + 𝐴 
who has been contributing for the last 𝑐 years. 
The average initial pension for individuals who retire at the retirement age, 𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡), is a 
weighted average of the 𝐴 different pensions once settled. To determine this benefit, the 
system does not take into account the contributions made (if any) by the contributor 
before joining the scheme: 
𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) = 𝐾�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑎𝑐𝐴𝐹(𝑥𝑒+𝐴)𝐿𝑇𝐶(𝑛) + 𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) = 𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑁𝐷𝐶 + 𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) [4.] 
where 𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) is the average supplementary retirement benefit at time 𝑡, defined as: 
𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) = ∑ 𝑀𝑎𝑥 �𝑃(𝑦� ,𝑐,𝑡)𝑀𝐼𝑁 − 𝑃(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑐,𝑡)𝑁𝐷𝐶 , 0� ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑐,𝑡)𝐴𝑐=1 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) = 𝑉𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝐴𝐹(𝑥𝑒+𝐴)𝐿𝑇𝐶(𝑛)  [5.] 
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where 𝑉𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) is the difference between the present value of the positive differences 
between the minimum pensions awarded and the account balances of participants 
available at the time of retirement (𝑡)  for age 𝑥𝑒 + 𝐴 , under the assumption that all 
pensions are indexed at the same rate (𝛼). In this case, the concept can be formalized as: 
𝑉𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) = �𝑀𝑎𝑥 �𝑃(𝑦� ,𝑐,𝑡)𝑀𝐼𝑁 − 𝑃(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑐,𝑡)𝑁𝐷𝐶 , 0� ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑐,𝑡)𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) ∙ 𝐴𝐹(𝑥𝑒+𝐴)𝐿𝑇𝐶(𝑛)𝐴𝑐=1  [6.] 
The total spending on new retirement pensions awarded in year 𝑡 can be expressed as: 
𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
�
𝐾�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑎𝑐
𝐴𝐹(𝑥𝑒+𝐴)𝐿𝑇𝐶(𝑛)��������
𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑁𝐷𝐶
́ + 𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) [7.] 
In short, the main way in which this differs from a pure NDC scheme is that, if the amount 
of the initial retirement pension (including a graded LTC benefit) is below a minimum 
value, the amount is supplemented up to the minimum benefit. The minimum pension 
guarantee requires that the government pay an amount equivalent to the difference 
between the accumulated notional pension account at the time of retirement and the 
amount that would provide an annuity equivalent to the MPB. 
The system's turnover duration (𝑻𝑫) and contribution asset (𝑪𝑨): If the rules of the 
pension system, mainly the contribution rate applied and the way the initial benefits are 
computed, and the demographic and economic framework detailed in the benchmark 
model are taken into account, then the process for obtaining the system's liabilities and the 
analytical expressions for the system's turnover duration (𝑇𝐷) and contribution asset (𝐶𝐴) 
can be separated into 4 additional steps (Ventura-Marco and Vidal Meliá, 2014; Pérez-
Salamero et al., 2017): 
1.-The analytical expressions for the system's liabilities from the actuarial point of view. 
2.-The analytical expression for the system's 𝑇𝐷  in the form of pay-out and pay-in 
durations. 
3.-The expression for the 𝑇𝐷  as the difference in the weighted average ages of the 
pensioners and contributors. 
4.-The system's 𝑇𝐷 and 𝐶𝐴 as weighting for the 𝑇𝐷𝑠 and 𝐶𝐴𝑠 for each contingency. 
After some modifications, applying the last 3 steps to the NDC scheme with retirement 
and 𝐿𝑇𝐶 is not a difficult task, but the application of step 1 needs to be revisited in depth.  
The liabilities side 
The entries shown on the right-hand side of Table 1 are detailed below under the 
assumption that the system is in a mature state. Once the system reaches the mature state 
𝑡 = 𝜔 − 𝑥𝑒 − 𝐴 years from inception, it pays full benefits to all generations of pensioners 
irrespective of their health status. The contribution rate that guarantees equality between 
contribution revenue and pension expenditure is constant over time and is the product of 
the stabilized demographic ratio and the financial ratio. The financial ratio is constant 
because the average pension and average contribution base both evolve at the rate of 
variation in wages (contribution base). 
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The social insurance accounting proposal splits the system into two parts: the pure NDC 
part and the redistributive part, which includes the assets and liabilities originating from 
non-contributory rights (NCRs).  
A) The NDC part  
Liability to pensioners for retirement 
For able/healthy pensioners, the NDC liability can be expressed as: 
𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝑅] 𝑡𝑟 = � 𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘,𝑡)𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝑟] ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘,𝑡)𝑟 ∙ �?̈?𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘𝑟𝛼 + � 𝐴𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘𝑟𝑑𝑗𝛼𝜉𝑟𝑗𝑛
𝑗=1 ��������������������
𝐴𝐹(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘)𝐿𝑇𝐶(𝑛)
𝑤−(𝑥𝑒+𝐴)
𝑘=0  [8.] 
where, 𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘,𝑡)𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝑟] : is the average pension for healthy pensioners by age at time 𝑡.  𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘,𝑡)𝑟 : is the number of healthy pensioners by age at time 𝑡. 
𝐴𝐹(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘)𝐿𝑇𝐶(𝑛) : is the actuarial discount factor for healthy pensioners by age (see formula [1.] 
in this Technical Appendix) 
Liability to pensioners for LTC 
The NDC liabilities with respect to the 𝑖 ∈ {1,2,⋯ ,𝑛}  grade pensioners can be expressed 
as: 
𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝑑𝑖] 𝑡𝑟 = � 𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘,𝑡)𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝑑𝑖] ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘,𝑡)𝑑𝑖 ∙ �?̈?𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘𝑑𝑖𝛼 + � 𝐴𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑗𝛼     𝜉𝑖𝑗𝑛
𝑗=𝑖+1 �
���������������������
𝐴𝐹𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘 𝐿𝑇𝐶(𝑖,𝑛)
𝑤−(𝑥𝑒+𝐴)
𝑘=1  
[9.] 
where, 𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘,𝑡)𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝑑𝑖] : is the average pension for pensioners in the 𝑖 level of dependence by 
age at time 𝑡.   𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘,𝑡)𝑑𝑖 : is the number of retired people in the 𝑖 level of dependence by age at time 𝑡. 
𝐴𝐹𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘
 𝐿𝑇𝐶(𝑖,𝑛): is the actuarial discount factor for pensioners in the 𝑖 level of dependence by 
age. In the particular case of 𝑖 = 𝑛, 𝐴𝐹𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘 𝐿𝑇𝐶(𝑛,𝑛)= ?̈?𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘𝑑𝑛𝛼   
?̈?𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘
𝛼𝑑𝑖 : is the present value at age 𝑥𝑒 + 𝐴 + 𝑘 of 1 monetary unit of a lifetime pension 
payable in advance while the pensioner remains in the 𝑖 level of dependence, indexed at 
rate 𝛼 with a technical interest rate equal to 𝐺. 
𝐴𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘
𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑗𝛼𝜉𝑖𝑗  : is the present actuarial value, for a pensioner in the 𝑖 level of dependence aged 
𝑥𝑒 + 𝐴 + 𝑘, of the graded LTC annuity that supplements 1 monetary unit of their LTC 
pension by percentage 𝜉𝑖𝑗 , where 𝑗 ∈ {1,2, . .𝑛} and  𝑗 > 𝑖. The enhanced benefits are paid 
from the moment the pensioner makes a transition to a worse health state and for as long 
as they remain in this state of dependence. 
The total NDC liabilities to pensioners for LTC are: 
𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝐿𝑇𝐶] 𝑡𝑟 = � 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝑑𝑖] 𝑡𝑟𝑛
𝑖=1  [10.] 
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Liability to contributors for retirement 
For the retirement contingency, the NDC liability to current contributors is equal to: 
𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝑅] 𝑡𝑐 =  �𝐾(𝑥𝑒+𝑘,𝑡)𝑇𝑎𝑐(𝑅)𝐴
𝑘=1 = 𝜃𝑅 ∙ ���𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝑠,𝑡)𝑘−1𝑠=0𝐴𝑘=1 ∙ 𝑦(𝑥𝑒+𝑠,𝑡)� [11.] 
where: 𝐾(𝑥𝑒+𝑘,𝑡)𝑇𝑎𝑐(𝑅) : is the total accumulated notional capital for retirement at time t for 
individuals aged 𝑥𝑒 + 𝑘.  
𝜃𝑅: is the defined contribution rate in a mature state for retirement. 
𝑦(𝑥𝑒+𝑠,𝑡): is the average wage (contribution base) by age at time 𝑡  
The notional account is an accumulation of the contributions made, the survivor dividend 
distributed and the returns generated over the participant's working life. Formula [11.] 
includes the distributed survivor dividend, given that it takes into account all the 
contributions made by all the contributors (living or dead at time t). It is easy to 
demonstrate that:  
�𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝑠,𝑡−𝑘+𝑠) · 𝑦(𝑥𝑒+𝑠,𝑡−𝑘+𝑠) · (1 + 𝐺)𝑘−𝑠𝑘−1
𝑠=0
= �𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝑠,𝑡) · 𝑦(𝑥𝑒+𝑠,𝑡)𝑘−1
𝑠=0
 
 
[12.] 
This liability is calculated using notional philosophy, i.e. the liability to contributors is the 
sum of the pension balances allocated to retirement of all active contributors. This 
procedure is equivalent to the accumulated benefit obligations approach 26  used when 
estimating the accrued-to-date liabilities. It corresponds to the benefits that a contributor 
would receive if the plan was shut down today and is thus often called the ‘termination’ 
liability. 
Liability to contributors for LTC 
The NDC liability to contributors for LTC is: 
𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝐿𝑇𝐶] 𝑡𝑐 =  �𝐾(𝑥𝑒+𝑘,𝑡)𝑇𝑎𝑐(𝐿𝑇𝐶)𝐴
𝑘=1 = 𝜃𝐿𝑇𝐶 ∙ ��� 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝑠,𝑡)𝑘−1𝑠=0𝐴𝑘=1 ∙ 𝑦(𝑥𝑒+𝑠,𝑡)� [13.] 
where 𝐾(𝑥𝑒+𝑘,𝑡)𝑇𝑎𝑐(𝑅) : is the total accumulated notional capital for LTC at time t for individuals 
aged 𝑥𝑒 + 𝑘. 
𝜃𝐿𝑇𝐶: is the defined contribution rate in a mature state for LTC.  
The total NDC liability to current contributors is: 
𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶 𝑡𝑐 = 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝑅] 𝑡𝑐 + 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝐿𝑇𝐶] 𝑡𝑐 [14.] 
Formulas [11.] and [13.] show that the pension balances have been separated into 
contingencies, but this is not strictly necessary.  
Under the assumption of a mature state – which means that contributions perfectly match 
pension payments so the accumulated deficit and accumulated surplus are zero – the 
26 This considers only the present value of benefits earned to date. Future wage increases are not taken into 
account. 
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system’s total NDC liabilities ( 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶 𝑡𝑆) are also the sum of all the liabilities decribed above 
(total pension entitlements): 
𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶 𝑡
𝑆 = 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝑅] 𝑡𝑟 + 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝐿𝑇𝐶] 𝑡𝑟���������������𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝑅] 𝑡𝑐 + 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝐿𝑇𝐶] 𝑡𝑐���������������
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
 [15.] 
B) The redistributive part (NCR) 
Liability to pensioners for retirement 
𝑉𝑁𝐶𝑅[𝑅] 𝑡𝑟 = � 𝑉𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘,𝑡)𝑅 ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘,𝑡)𝑟𝑤−(𝑥𝑒+𝐴)
𝑘=0  [16.] 
where 𝑉𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘,𝑡)𝑟  is the present value of the average supplementary retirement benefit 
by age at time 𝑡. 
Liability to pensioners for LTC 
𝑉𝑁𝐶𝑅[𝐿𝑇𝐶] 𝑡𝑟 = � 𝑉𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘,𝑡)𝐿𝑇𝐶 ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘,𝑡)𝐿𝑇𝐶𝑤−(𝑥𝑒+𝐴)
𝑘=1  [17.] 
where 𝑉𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴+𝑘,𝑡)𝐿𝑇𝐶  is the present value of the average supplementary LTC graded benefit 
by age at time 𝑡. 
Liability to contributors for retirement and LTC 
As stated in Section 2.2., the inclusion of an MPB implies the valuation of the accrued 
minimum benefit by means of the prospective and forecasting method. Obviously this 
amount, 𝑉𝑡𝑐, will be higher than the sum of the pension balances of active contributors, 
𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶 𝑡𝑐, the difference being the liability to contributors for retirement and LTC.  
For retirement: 
𝑉𝑁𝐶𝑅[𝑅] 𝑡𝑐 = 𝑉[𝑅] 𝑡𝑐 − 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝑅] 𝑡𝑐 = 𝑉𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑅 ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) ∙ � 𝐹∗ℎ𝐴
ℎ=1  
[18.] 
= 
�𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) − 𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑁𝐷𝐶 ����������������
𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)
∙ ?̈?𝑥𝑒+𝐴
𝑟𝛼 ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) ∙ �𝐹∗ℎ𝐴
ℎ=1
 
 = 
𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) ∙ ?̈?𝑥𝑒+𝐴𝑟𝛼 ∙ �𝐹∗ℎ𝐴
ℎ=1�����������������������
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠
−  𝜃𝑅 ∙ ���𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝑘,𝑡)𝑘
ℎ=0
𝐴−1
𝑘=0
∙ 𝑦(𝑥𝑒+𝑘,𝑡) ∙ 𝐹∗ℎ�
�������������������������
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡���������������������������������������������������
𝑉
[𝑅] 
𝑡
𝑐
 
− 
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�𝐾(𝑥𝑒+𝑘,𝑡)𝑇𝑎𝑐(𝑅)𝐴
𝑘=1�������
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
�������������������������
𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶
[𝑅] 
𝑡
𝑐
 
where 
𝑉𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑅 ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) = 𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) ∙ ?̈?𝑥𝑒+𝐴𝑟𝛼  [19.] 
with 𝐹∗ = 1+𝐺
1+𝑑
 being an indexing factor dependent on 𝐺 (wage bill growth) and 𝑑 (discount 
rate). 
For LTC: 
𝑉𝑁𝐶𝑅[𝐿𝑇𝐶] 𝑡𝑐 = 𝑉[𝐿𝑇𝐶] 𝑡𝑐 − 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝐿𝑇𝐶] 𝑡𝑐 = 𝑉𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝐿𝑇𝐶 ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) ∙ � 𝐹∗ℎ𝐴
ℎ=1  
[20.] 
= 
��𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) − 𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑁𝐷𝐶 � ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) ∙� 𝐴𝑥𝑒+𝐴𝑟𝑑𝑗𝛼𝜉𝑟𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 � ∙�𝐹∗ℎ
𝐴
ℎ=1
 = (𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) ∙� 𝐴𝑥𝑒+𝐴𝑟𝑑𝑗𝛼𝜉𝑟𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 )�𝐹∗ℎ𝐴
ℎ=1�����������������������������
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑇𝐶 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠
 
− 
 𝜃𝐿𝑇𝐶 ���𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝑘,𝑡)𝑘
ℎ=0
𝐴−1
𝑘=0
∙ 𝑦(𝑥𝑒+𝑘,𝑡) ∙ 𝐹∗ℎ�
�������������������������
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑇𝐶
 
− 
�𝐾(𝑥𝑒+𝑘,𝑡)𝑇𝑎𝑐(𝐿𝑇𝐶)𝐴
𝑘=1���������
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑇𝐶
���������������������
𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶
[𝐿𝑇𝐶] 
𝑡
𝑐
 
where 
𝑉𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝐿𝑇𝐶 ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) = 𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) ∙� 𝐴𝑥𝑒+𝐴𝑟𝑑𝑗𝛼𝜉𝑟𝑗𝑛𝑗=1  [21.] 
Under the assumptions made, the present value of pensions for current contributors is 
equivalent to the sum of the present value of future contributions plus the total 
accumulated notional capital for retirement and LTC. 
As a result, the total liabilities to contributors for retirement and LTC due to the NCRs can 
be expressed as: 
𝑉𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑐 = 𝑉𝑡𝑐 − 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶 𝑡𝑐 = 𝑉𝑆𝑃����(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) ∙ � 𝐹∗ℎ𝐴
ℎ=1  [22.] = 
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�𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) − 𝑃�(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡)𝑁𝐷𝐶 � ∙ 𝑙(𝑥𝑒+𝐴,𝑡) ∙ 𝐴𝐹𝑥𝑒+𝐴 𝐿𝑇𝐶(𝑛) ∙ �𝐹∗ℎ𝐴
ℎ=1
 
The system’s total NCR liabilities ( 𝑉𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑆) are also the sum of all the liabilities described 
above: 
𝑉𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡
𝑆 = 𝑉𝑁𝐶𝑅[𝑅] 𝑡𝑟 + 𝑉𝑁𝐶𝑅[𝐿𝑇𝐶] 𝑡𝑟���������������𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝑉𝑁𝐶𝑅[𝑅] 𝑡𝑐 + 𝑉𝑁𝐶𝑅[𝐿𝑇𝐶] 𝑡𝑐���������������𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 1 𝑖𝑠 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜���������������
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
 [23.] 
And the system’s total liabilities (𝑉𝑡𝑆) are: 
 𝑉𝑡𝑆 = 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶 𝑡𝑆 + 𝑉𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑆 [24.] 
The assets side and the steady state balance ratio. 
The system's contribution asset ( 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐶 𝑡𝑆) can be understood as the maximum level of 
liabilities ( 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶
𝑡
𝑆) that can be financed by the contribution rate.  
A different question is the redistributive element of the scheme, i.e. the commitments to 
pensioners and contributors to cover NCR rights. In our proposal the counterpart on the 
assets side is the buffer fund allocated to back up the non-contributory rights ( 𝐵𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑆) that 
should be financed from general revenues. Therefore, 
 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐶 𝑡𝑆 + 𝐵𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑆�������������𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶 𝑡𝑆 + 𝑉𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑆�����������
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠  [25.] 
The value of the system's contribution asset is the product of the system's turnover 
duration (𝑇𝐷𝑡𝑆) and the value of the NDC system’s contributions (𝐶𝑡𝑆) made in that period 
for the retirement and LTC contingencies: 
𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐶 𝑡
𝑆 = 𝑇𝐷𝑡𝑆  ∙ 𝐶𝑡𝑆 [26.] 
The 𝑇𝐷𝑡𝑆 for the system is interpreted as the number of years expected to elapse before the 
committed liabilities with contributors (pay-in, 𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑆) and pensioners (pay-out, 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑆 ) for both 
retirement and LTC contingencies are completely renewed at the current contribution level.  
In the case of retirement, the 𝑇𝐷𝑡𝑅 indicates the expected years a contribution will stay in 
the system if it were paid by a hypothetical contributor of 𝐴𝑐 years and remained within the 
contribution liability until retirement age was reached (pay-in, 𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑅 = 𝐴 − 𝐴𝑐), after which 
it was received by a hypothetical able/healthy pensioner of 𝐴𝑟𝑅 years after remaining within 
the liability to this type of pensioner during the pay-out (𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑅 = 𝐴𝑟𝑅 − 𝐴).  
Similarly for the LTC contingency, the 𝑇𝐷𝑡𝐿𝑇𝐶 represents the expected years a monetary 
unit contributed to the system will stay in the system if it were paid by a contributor of 𝐴𝐶  
years and remained within the liability to contributors until the affiliate became an LTC 
recipient (pay-in, 𝑝𝑡𝑐𝐿𝑇𝐶), after which it was received by a healthy/dependent pensioner of 
𝐴𝑟
𝐿𝑇𝐶 years after remaining within the liability to this type of pensioner during the pay-out (𝑝𝑡𝑐𝐿𝑇𝐶𝐺). 
The system's turnover duration can be calculated as the weighted average of the 𝑇𝐷𝑡𝑆 for 
both contingencies, LTC (𝑇𝐷𝑡𝐿𝑇𝐶 ) and retirement (𝑇𝐷𝑡𝑅 ), with the weighting being the 
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spending on pensions by contingency (𝑃𝑇𝑡𝐿𝑇𝐶 and 𝑃𝑇𝑡𝑅) as a proportion of total spending 
(𝑃𝑇𝑡𝑁𝐷𝐶). Thus 
𝑇𝐷𝑡
𝑆 =  𝑇𝐷𝑡𝐿𝑇𝐶 ∙ 𝑃𝑇𝑡𝐿𝑇𝐶 + 𝑇𝐷𝑡𝑅 ∙ 𝑃𝑇𝑡𝑅
𝑃𝑇𝑡
𝑁𝐷𝐶  [27.] 
where 𝑃𝑇𝑡𝐿𝑇𝐶 = ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑖=1  and 𝑇𝐷𝑡𝐿𝑇𝐶  can also be calculated as the weighted average of 
the 𝑛 𝑇𝐷𝑡
𝑑𝑖 , with the weighting being the spending on 𝑖 ∈ {1,2,⋯ ,𝑛} pensions (𝑃𝑇𝑡𝑑𝑖) as a 
part of total LTC spending (𝑃𝑇𝑡𝐿𝑇𝐶). 
Reasoning by analogy with the development made by Ventura-Marco and Vidal-Meliá 
(2014) and Pérez-Salamero et al. (2017), the system's turnover duration can also be 
calculated as the difference between the weighted average of the average ages of LTC 
(𝐴𝑟𝐿𝑇𝐶 ) and retirement (𝐴𝑟𝑅 ) pensioners, with the weightings here being spending on 
pensions per contingency as a proportion of total spending27 and the average age of the 
contributors (𝐴𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐶 = 𝐴𝐶𝑅 = 𝐴𝐶 ). The analytical expression for the system's 𝑇𝐷 can also be 
expressed in the form of pay-out and pay-in durations: 
𝑇𝐷𝑡
𝑆 = (𝐴𝑟𝐿𝑇𝐶 − 𝐴𝑐 )���������(𝑝𝑡𝑐𝐿𝑇𝐶+𝑝𝑡𝑟𝐿𝑇𝐶) ∙ 𝑃𝑇𝑡𝐿𝑇𝐶 + (𝐴𝑟𝑅 − 𝐴𝑐 )�������(𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑅+𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑅) ∙ 𝑃𝑇𝑡𝑅
𝑃𝑇𝑡
𝑁𝐷𝐶  
[28.] 
Finally, the impact on the ABS of introducing the MPB is the difference between formulas 
[24.] and [15.], i.e. the liabilities originating from NCRs, and this needs to have an 
equivalent entry on the assets side. In our proposal there are two entries, 𝐵𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝐿𝑇𝐶 and 
𝐵𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡
𝑅, and their amounts reveal the present value of the NCRs. Thus an NDC scheme 
providing an MPB becomes a hybrid type of DC system and is partially funded in this 
approach. 
The system's buffer fund ( 𝐵𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑅
𝑡
𝑆
), which gives credibility and financial sustainability to the 
pensions promises made in the form of the MPB, can be computed as follows: 
𝐵𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑅
𝑡
𝑆 = 𝑉𝑡𝑆 − 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐶 𝑡𝑆  
[29.] 
= 
𝑉𝐿𝑇𝐶 𝑡
𝑟 +  𝑉𝐿𝑇𝐶 𝑡𝑐 − 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐶 𝑡𝐿𝑇𝐶�������������������
𝐵𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡
𝑑
+ 𝑉𝑅 𝑡𝑟 +  𝑉𝑅 𝑡𝑐 − 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐶 𝑡𝑅���������������𝐵𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑅  
and the amount of this is the present value of the public subsidies needed to finance the 
MPB. 
It is also straightforward to obtain that the value of the system's public contribution asset is 
the product of the system's turnover duration (𝑇𝐷𝑡𝑆) and the value of the 𝑁𝐶𝑅  public 
27 Also 𝐴𝑟𝐿𝑇𝐺 is the weighted average of the 𝑖 ∈ {1,2,⋯ ,𝑛} grade − LTG average ages. 
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contributions ( 𝑆𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑆) made in that period by the sponsor in order to pay for the 𝑀𝑃𝐵𝑠, 
and this is equivalent to the system's buffer fund28: 
𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡
𝑆 = 𝑇𝐷𝑡𝑺  ∙ 𝑆𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑆 = 𝐵𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑆 [30.] 
If the approach adopted to back up the increase in liabilities due to the introduction of an 
MPB is the buffer fund method, then the higher the level of the MPB stipulated, the higher 
the degree of funding (𝐷𝐹𝑡𝑆 ) needed to maintain the system's financial equilibrium (or 
short-term sustainability). The degree of funding is the ratio between the amount of the 
buffer fund and the system’s total liabilities: 
𝐷𝐹𝑡
𝑆 =  𝐵𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑆
𝑉𝑡
𝑆  [31.] 
The system’s sustainability indicator, known as the steady state balance ratio (𝐵𝑅𝑡𝑆, the ratio 
between the system’s assets and liabilities), has to be equal to one in the case of a balanced 
pension system, our primary assumption. 
Because an NDC scheme is not prefunded and uses current contribution revenues to 
finance current pension expenditure, it cannot promise the necessary liquidity at all times 
unless special arrangements are made. In practice, for the sake of liquidity it is advisable to 
have a reserve fund, as pointed out by Holzmann et al. (2013), who calculated that by 
assuming only stochastic-type fluctuations around a mean notional rate of return, the size 
of a liquidity reserve fund should accumulate between 6 months and 24 months of 
expenditure. A reserve fund is also advisable in DB PAYG pension systems. The actuarial 
balance of the OASDI (old age, survivors and disability insurance) programme considers 
that the minimum level of the reserve fund is one year’s expenditure.    
Finally, in our model the balance ratio can be broken down by contingencies with the 
weightings here being the liabilities per contingency as a proportion of total liabilities: 
𝐵𝑅𝑡
𝑆 = 𝐵𝑅𝑡𝑅 ∙ � 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝑅] 𝑡𝑐 + 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝑅] 𝑡𝑟�
𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶
𝑡
𝑆 + 𝐵𝑅𝑡𝐿𝑇𝐶 ∙ � 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝐿𝑇𝐶] 𝑡𝑐 + 𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶[𝐿𝑇𝐶] 𝑡𝑟�
𝑉𝑁𝐷𝐶
𝑡
𝑆  [32.] 
Finally, as Metzger (2018) points out, the question of sustainability as conveyed by our 
methodology has a result different from that of generational accounting (GA)29, which 
assesses the sustainability of the pension scheme in the very long term given the underlying 
assumptions about future demographic developments. However, GA is unable to take into 
account the many details of a pension system (Holzmann et al., 2001). 
28 If it is assumed that the general income tax base is different to the contributory wages base, then a different 
turnover duration is obtained:  𝑇𝐷𝑡𝑵𝑪𝑹 ≠  𝑇𝐷𝑡𝑺 . With a yearly NCR public contribution, the public 
contribution asset is simplified for ABS purposes by 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑆 = 𝑆𝑁𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑆. 
29 GA has become an important instrument for assessing the financial sustainability of the public sector. It 
calculates “lifetime net tax rates” for each one-year cohort of the population up to at least age 90 and a 
separate lifetime net tax rate for all future generations combined (Auerbach et al., 1992; Kotlikoff and 
Raffelhüschen, 1999). GA may be an interesting academic exercise but, despite its spread worldwide, some 
researchers find that it suffers from numerous problems of complexity, logic and validity (Ruffing et al., 
2014).  
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Our proposal measures sustainability via the balance ratio from a different perspective, i.e. 
under a mature-state assumption with respect to the year of the valuation date. If the time 
interval between new estimates of the solvency indicator is short enough (a year), each 
interval between can be interpreted as a transitory steady state (Lee, 2006). This is the 
approach developed in practice by the Swedish authorities (TSPS, 2017), so, at least on the 
practical side, the mature state assumed by this social insurance accounting framework 
cannot be viewed as a limitation.  
The income statement 
The change in net worth, also known as the net gain/loss for the year, is determined in the 
simplest way by comparing the system's assets and liabilities in two consecutive periods (𝑡 − 1, 𝑡]. 
𝑁𝑊𝑡
𝑆  = 𝛿𝐵𝐹𝑡𝑆���
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝛿𝐶𝐴𝑡𝑆���𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 − 𝛿𝑉𝑡𝑆�𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠�������������������������
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠
 
[33.] 
If 𝑁𝑊𝑡𝑆 > 0 ⇒ 𝑃𝑡𝑆 , the change in net worth is positive, i.e. in this period the system has 
actuarial gains. If 𝑁𝑊𝑡𝑆 < 0 ⇒ 𝐿𝑡𝑆, the change in net worth is negative, i.e. in this period 
the system has losses. If 𝑁𝑊𝑡𝑆 = 0 , the system’s worth (financial position) does not 
change. 
The net gain/loss for the year can be detailed as follows: 
1.- Change in fund/financial asset 
𝛿𝐵𝐹𝑡
𝑆  = 𝐶𝑡𝑆 − 𝑃𝑇𝑡𝑆 + 𝑟𝑡 ∙ 𝐵𝐹𝑡−1𝑆  [34.] 
where:  
𝐶𝑡
𝑆 : is the total income from contributions.  
𝑃𝑇𝑡
𝑆: is the total pension disbursements. 
 𝑟𝑡: is the net return on funded capital. 
2.-Change in contribution asset: 
𝛿𝐶𝐴𝑡
𝑆  = 𝐶𝐴𝑡𝑆 − 𝐶𝐴𝑡−1𝑆 = 𝛿𝐶𝑡𝑆�𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛿𝑇𝐷𝑡𝑆���
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
 
[35.] = 
�(𝐶𝑡𝑆 − 𝐶𝑡−1𝑆 )  ∙ (𝑇𝐷𝑡−1𝑆 + 𝑇𝐷𝑡𝑆)2 ����������������������
𝛿𝐶𝑡
𝑆
+ �(𝐶𝑡𝑆 + 𝐶𝑡−1𝑆 )2 ∙ (𝑇𝐷𝑡𝑆 − 𝑇𝐷𝑡−1𝑆 )�������������������
𝛿𝑇𝐷𝑡
𝑆
� 
Formula [35.] resembles the formula used by the Swedish authorities (TSPS, 2017), but 
there are many ways to analyse the change in contribution asset including the following: 
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𝛿𝐶𝐴𝑡
𝑆  = (𝐶𝑡𝑆 − 𝐶𝑡−1𝑆 )  ∙ 𝑇𝐷𝑡−1𝑆�������������𝛿𝐶𝑡𝑆 + 𝐶𝑡𝑆 ∙ (𝑇𝐷𝑡𝑆 − 𝑇𝐷𝑡−1𝑆 )�������������
𝛿𝑇𝐷𝑡
𝑆
 [36.] 
3.-Change in pension liability: 
𝛿𝑉𝑡
𝑆  = 𝑉𝑡𝑆 − 𝑉𝑡−1𝑆 = 𝐶𝑡𝑆 − 𝑃𝑇𝑡𝑆 + 𝐼𝑡𝑆 + 𝑒𝑡𝑆 + 𝐵𝑡𝑆 [37.] 
where:  
𝐼𝑡
𝑆: is the indexation effect. 
𝑒𝑡
𝑆: is the life expectancy effect.  
𝐵𝑡
𝑆: is the biometric data effect. 
Finally, the income statement can easily be disaggregated by contingency in formulas [33.] 
to [37.] simply by changing the superscript “S” to “R” or “LTC” where necessary.      
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.  
ABM: Automatic balance mechanism. 
ABS: Actuarial balance sheet.  
ADL: Basic activities of daily living. 
BF: Buffer fund. 
CA: Contribution asset.  
CFC: Cash for care benefits 
DB: Defined benefit  
DC: Defined contribution  
EPA: Enhanced pension annuity 
G: Covered wage bill growth. 
GA: Generational accounting. 
GDP: Gross domestic product.  
IADL: Instrumental activities of daily living. 
LCA: Life care annuity. 
LTC: Long-term care.  
MOLG: Multistate overlapping generations model.  
MPB: Minimum pension benefit.  
NCR: Non-contributory rights. 
NDC: Notional defined contribution.  
OASDI: Old age, survivors and disability insurance. 
OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
PAYG: Pay-as-you-go.  
PCA: Public contribution asset. 
TD: Turnover duration. 
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